Opinions expressed or implied in this chapter are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of Okinawa Prefectural Government.
Historical Interactions with China

- Okinawa, in the days when it was known as the Ryukyu Kingdom, engaged in trade with various Asian nations and became one of the major commercial hubs in East Asia.
- The kingdom’s ability to engage in commerce with nations in Asia was based on its status under China’s system of tributary states. This began in 1372, when Satto, king of Chusan (one of several Ryukyu kingdoms), accepted an invitation from China’s Hongwu Emperor to enter into a tributary relationship with China.
- China subsequently invited many students from the Ryukyu Kingdom to study in China and played an important role in education and the cultivation of skills in Ryukyu. In addition, many people in China were naturalized as residents of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and this had a considerable influence on the subsequent history and culture of Okinawa.
- The close relationship between Okinawa and China has endured for around 500 years.

<Longstanding Ties with China Reflected in Contemporary Okinawa Culture and Lifestyle>

- Eisā, a Traditional Dance
- Ryukyu Cuisine
- Shīsā, a Mythical Lion-Dog
- Häri, a Boat Race
- Karate
- The Seimei Festival

Shinkō Sensu. Collection of Okinawa Prefectural Museum & Art Museum
Interactions with China Today

Sister Relationships
- Fujian Province & Okinawa (since 1997)
- Sister-city relationships: Fuzhou, Fujian province, and Naha (1981); Quanzhou, Fujian province, and Urasoe (1988); Xiamen, Fujian province, and Ginowan (1995)

Human Exchanges
- University and high school students from Okinawa Prefecture visit China.
- Okinawa hosts Chinese high school students.
- Human exchanges among Fujian Normal University, Okinawa Prefectural Government, Okinawa Prefectural University of Arts, University of the Ryukyus, and Okinawa International University

Cultural Interactions
- Scholarly exchanges related to historical relations between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom (donation of historical Rekidai Hōan documents, scholarly exchanges, symposium)
- Studies of Ryukyu Islander cemeteries and stone monuments in the province of Fujian
- Cultural events, including China-Japan-Amami-Okinawa friendship and culture festival

Economic Interactions
- The Okinawa Prefectural Government established offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taipei. Okinawa has drawn lots of Chinese tourists, has developed more channels for sales of its local goods, and air routes between Okinawa and China have expanded. The government has also provided support for overseas expansion by local businesses, and has welcomed enterprises to the prefecture.
- Export values of food and drinks in 2012: To mainland China at 105,890 million yen; to Hong Kong at 569,600 million yen; and to Taiwan at 195,470 million yen

Tourism-related Interactions
- Tourists from mainland China visiting Okinawa in 2012 totaled 69,500 (33,000 in 2011). However, there has been a marked decline since a series of incidents causing friction between Japan and China, starting in September 2012.
- Tourists from Hong Kong visiting Okinawa in 2012 totaled 58,000 (51,200 in 2011); tourists from Taiwan totaled 140,600 (113,000 in 2011)
1. The Impact of the Conflict over the Senkaku Islands

Throughout the survey, it was apparent that the people of Okinawa are very shocked about the recent series of events involving the Senkaku Islands.

In response to Q1 about impressions of China, approximately 30 percent of Okinawans clearly replied that they have an unfavorable impression of China, and combined with those who replied that they have a somewhat unfavorable impression of China, the number reaches nearly 90 percent.

Compared with the nationwide survey, a higher percentage of respondents cited an inability to understand the nationalist behavior and thinking of the Chinese, and actions by the Chinese that differ from international rules, as reasons for having a negative impression; likewise in Q3, a higher percentage of respondents cited Chinese nationalism, anti-Japanese sentiment, and China’s anti-Japanese education as obstacles to the development of Japan-China relations. Combined with the answers to Q7 regarding what historical issues should be resolved, the impact of the conflict over the Senkaku Islands is clear in the results.

In addition, as reasons for having a favorable impression of China, the highest percentage of respondents cited the development of the Chinese economy becoming an integral part of the Japanese economy. Conversely, the sudden decline in Chinese tourists due to the conflict between Japan and China.

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60 See Appendix. First Survey on Okinawan’s Impressions of China (p. 172 -) for details.
and China over the Senkaku Islands can be construed as a cause for having
an unfavorable impression (See Figure 1 and Figure 2).

2. Interest in Chinese History and Culture

Despite the problems involving the Senkaku Islands, a high percentage
of respondents with a favorable impression of China cited an interest in
Chinese cuisine, Chinese history, and Chinese culture as the reason, which
is unique when compared with nationwide results. Furthermore, many
written comments supporting substantial interest in history and culture
appeared in the “Other” column.

If Okinawans characteristically are significantly interested in Chinese
history and culture, then their impressions of China should be more
favorable.

3. Favorable Impressions of Taiwan

Although discord involving the Senkaku Islands also exists with Taiwan,
the people of Okinawa have a favorable impression of Taiwan.

In Q2, regarding impressions of Taiwan, nearly 80 percent of Okinawans
answered that they have a favorable impression of Taiwan, and many cited
a long history of relations, cultural commonality, and geographic proximity
as reasons for this. This illustrates that Okinawans feel close to Taiwan.
Taiwan’s assistance to Japan after the Great East Japan Earthquake is also
widely recognized.

As reasons for having an unfavorable impression, the highest percentage
of respondents cited the conflict over the Senkaku Islands, but if this
problem had not arisen, there probably would have been fewer respondents
with negative impressions.
In Q6 regarding whether respondents feel closer to China or to Taiwan, nearly 70 percent answered that they feel closer to Taiwan. This shows the deep-rooted, favorable impression of Taiwan compared with mainland China.

4. Economic Relations

In response to Q1, regarding reasons for having a favorable impression of China, and Q3 about obstacles to the development of Japan-China relations, the percentage of those who cited economic reasons and issues was relatively low. In addition, in Q4, fewer respondents than in the nationwide survey answered that Japan-China relations were important. Thus, it can be inferred that Okinawan awareness of economic relations with China is relatively weak.

This is likely because compared with Japan as a whole, which has a strong, economically interdependent relationship due to companies actively expanding into China, expansion into China by Okinawan companies is limited, and though increasing, the percentage of Chinese tourists who visit Okinawa is still low (See Figure 3).

5. Other Characteristics

In response to Q5 regarding whether respondents feel closer to China or to the U.S., more Okinawans than the respondents of the nationwide survey answered that they do not feel close to either. This reflects the problems that Okinawa faces with respect to U.S. military bases.

In the open response section regarding the reasons for unfavorable impressions of China and Taiwan in Q1 and Q2, comments about the poor manners of Chinese tourists visiting Okinawa stood out. This can be cited as something that should be improved in order to build friendly relations in the future.
In response to Q8 about whether respondents think a military conflict will arise in East Asian seas, the percentage of those who answered in the affirmative was higher in the Miyako and Yaeyama regions than in other regions. The percentage of the respondents in these regions who answered in Q9 that no territorial issues exist was also higher. Thus, regional differences were evident.

Okinawa was no different from Japan as a whole in terms of whether or not respondents had visited China (Q10) or had Chinese acquaintances (Q12). It also was not possible to confirm any especially close relationship with Taiwan based on Q11 and Q13.

6. Summary and Problems

Throughout the survey, it was clear that Okinawans have been very shocked about the series of events involving the Senkaku Islands. While anti-Japanese sentiment in China poses a challenge, we must also address the challenge of improving the impact that China’s actions have had on Japan, including Okinawa.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that there is friction over the Senkaku Islands with Taiwan as well, the impression that Okinawans have of Taiwan is favorable. However, the current relationship is not particularly deep, so there is much room for improvement in the future.

Through interaction and trade with China and other Asian countries, Okinawa has a history of absorbing and assimilating many cultures. However, the current relationship between Okinawa and China does not appear to be particularly deep or strong, which shows that historical and cultural attributes currently do not have much leverage.

However, interest in China’s history and culture is strong, so there is plenty of room to broadly develop the relationship, including the economy,
by fully using geographic and cultural-historical attributes. The question is how to stimulate more interaction in the future. The survey results have clearly indicated the tasks that the Okinawans face.

Figure 1. Trends in the number of tourists arriving from mainland China (Okinawa Prefecture)

Figure 2. Trends in the number of tourists arriving from Taiwan (Okinawa Prefecture)
### Figure 3. Tourists entering Okinawa (2012, Okinawa Prefecture)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Percent distribution of total foreign tourists</th>
<th>Percent distribution of total incoming tourists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of incoming tourists</td>
<td>5,835,800</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>376,700</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland China</td>
<td>69,500</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>140,600</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>34,200</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Key Assertions

The points I would like to assert in this thesis are the following.

1) The Senkaku Islands acted as an important maritime marker for navigators in pre-modern East Asia. The navigators who passed by the Senkaku Islands and surrounding waters most frequently were the Ryukyu Kingdom’s sailors; they were familiar with the existence of these islands. However, this doesn’t mean that the Senkaku Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom; the kingdom was merely aware of their geographic location. At the same time, countries in pre-modern East Asia, including the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the people who lived in these countries did not have the intention or motivation to occupy the uninhabited Senkaku Islands.

2) After the Ryukyu Kingdom fell in the spring of 1879 and Okinawa Prefecture was established, Okinawa Prefecture promoted noteworthy measures for the uninhabited islands. It sought to develop and populate the Daito and Senkaku Islands. The development was pursued by private business owners, not directly by Okinawa’s prefectural government. This resulted in the creation of new frontiers on the Pacific side (Daito Islands) to Okinawa’s east and the South China Sea (East Sea) side (Senkaku Islands) to Okinawa’s southwest. These businesses brought the two uninhabited island chains into Okinawa Prefecture’s governmental system.
3) We should discuss the Senkaku Islands problem with an objective, sober perspective based on the recognition of historical facts that constitute key issues in the discussion.

4) Japan and China’s conflict over the Senkaku Islands problem is not only detrimental for the national interests of both countries, but is also detrimental for the security and development of Okinawa and the Asia Pacific region. Instead of resorting to parochial nationalism, both Japan and China should try to resolve this problem by looking calmly toward the future of both countries.

5) The time has come for Okinawa’s prefectural government and Okinawa’s residents to consider what proactive contributions Okinawa can make toward the resolution of the Senkaku Islands problem.

2. Okinawa’s Historical Relationship with China and Japan

2-1 Situation in the Pre-Modern Period

Okinawa’s culture is derived from old Japanese culture. The fact that most symbolizes this is that Ryukyu language (Okinawa’s dialect) and Japanese (the dialect of mainland Japan) are derivations of a common language called “Proto-Japanese.” But as time passed, the people living on the Okinawa islands started their own history. The rise of the Ryukyu Kingdom is an event that symbolizes this history.

The Ryukyu Kingdom was an independent nation that governed the Okinawan Islands for the 450 years between 1429 and 1879. The Ryukyu Kingdom did not lead an isolated existence; it survived against a backdrop of international relations in East Asia.
Okinawa’s international relations were centered on its relationship with China (Ming Dynasty and later, Qing Dynasty), and this relationship greatly defined the development of the Ryukyu Kingdom itself. The Ryukyu King’s position was recognized by the Chinese Emperor. To this end, the Chinese Emperor directly dispatched a diplomatic mission each time a new king ascended the Ryukyu throne to recognize this person as the King of Ryukyu. The King of Ryukyu, who was recognized by the authority of the Emperor, regularly dispatched emissaries to the Emperor to pledge his loyalty. Like other Asian countries, Ryukyu was able to promote trade with China through this dependent diplomatic relationship.

A notable point in Ryukyu’s relationship with China is that the Chinese Emperor generally did not directly interfere with Ryukyu’s personnel or domestic affairs. Ryukyu was a nation ruled by a reigning king, and it was enough for that king to obey the authority of the Chinese Emperor.

However, the military invasion of Ryukyu by Japan’s Satsuma military in 1609 dramatically changed Ryukyu’s international relations. Ryukyu, which lost this war, was afterwards placed under the strong influence of the Japanese state with the Tokugawa Shogun as its head while still maintaining its diplomatic relations with China. Ryukyu’s leaders strived to maintain an identity that wasn’t absorbed by either China or Japan while being subservient to these major East Asian powers. For their part, China and Japan carefully avoided situations that would lead to direct conflict between them, and they expected Ryukyu to act as a sort of buffer between their countries.

In other words, although China and Japan had their own separate motives for their involvement in the Ryukyu Kingdom, they did not go further and take action to make Ryukyu China’s or Japan’s. And Ryukyu kept its nation alive by skillfully utilizing the gap that resulted from this stance taken by the two major nations.
2-2 Situation in the Early Modern Period

However, the modern country of Japan, which was created in 1868, sought to put an end to the existence of Ryukyu, which had survived as a buffer between Japan and China. Japan pushed Ryukyu to sever relations with China and become part of modern Japan. Ryukyu opposed this, but in the spring of 1879, the Japanese government mobilized its troops and police, forcibly eliminated the Ryukyu Kingdom, and established Okinawa Prefecture.

Japan’s forcible methods locked Japan and China into a bitter conflict from the 1870s to 1880s over the annexation of Ryukyu. This was because China protested fiercely, citing their sovereignty over Ryukyu against Japan, which had established Okinawa Prefecture and had started exercising substantive sovereignty over Ryukyu. Many of Okinawa’s leaders were also against the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture, and they launched various activities to seek the restoration of the kingdom. I will omit the details of this historic process here, but in conclusion, as a result of Japan’s victory in its war with China (1894–95, Sino-Japanese War), the residents of Okinawa gradually came to accept the reality that Okinawa was part of Japan.

Historians differ regarding how to judge Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom. I will not discuss this issue here, except to confirm the following points.

In the beginning of the 19th century, after the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture, intellectuals from Okinawa opened an active dialogue, stating that they would admit Okinawa was part of Japan. These statements were comprised of three essential points. First was the recognition that the Okinawa prefectural structure, which was an immediate reality, was not a colonial situation caused by Japan’s invasion but Okinawa’s legitimate situation as a member of Japanese society. The second point was
emphasized as a basis for the first. These intellectuals stressed that Okinawa’s culture had its roots in Japanese culture and that it was Okinawa’s destiny to belong to the cultural collective called Japan. In other words, they recognized that Okinawa belonging to Japan was an inevitable reality.

As the third point, these intellectuals stressed Okinawa’s distinctiveness. They recognized that even assuming Okinawa was part of Japan, Okinawa had a strong historical and cultural character compared to other regions in Japan and that it was important to continue supporting this.

One of the leading intellectuals to recognize the above points was Fuyuu Iha (1876–1947), and his statements had a major influence on subsequent Okinawa society.

3. The Senkaku Islands as Seen Through History

Based on the historical background that I have explained so far, I would like to point out recognized historical facts regarding the Senkaku Islands problem, which has rapidly become the central concern between Japan and China.

3-1 Navigational Marker for Ryukyu Ships

The Senkaku Islands were uninhabited through the pre-modern period and no groups such as the Ryukyus, Chinese, Japanese, or Koreans stably settled or formed a community on these islands. Not surprisingly, these islands were outside the Ryukyu Kingdom’s territory. The inhabited islands of Kume and Ishigaki were the closest islands to the Senkaku under the Ryukyu Kingdom’s control.

However, the Senkaku Islands were located on the navigational route that the Ryukyu Kingdom’s ships took to go back and forth to China and
were invaluable as a maritime marker. For approximately 500 years, Ryukyu ships conducted diplomacy and trade with China by sailing past the Senkaku islands and surrounding waters at least every other year.

The Chinese government designated Fuzhou in Fujian Province as the port of entry for Ryukyu ships. As a result, Ryukyu ships that left Naha Harbor passed through the surrounding waters of the Kerama Islands, Kume Island, and the Senkaku Islands to head to Fuzhou harbor. When returning home after completing business, they returned to Naha Harbor, taking almost an identical route. Therefore, although the Senkaku Islands were uninhabited, they played a crucial role as a navigational marker for Ryukyu ships. A picture scroll in the archives of the Okinawa Prefectural Museum & Art Museum is a symbolic document that tells this tale. It depicts, in detail, the islands and waters lying between Naha and Fuzhou and includes a clear depiction of the Senkaku Islands.

I would like to call attention to the fact that the people who knew the Senkaku Islands and surrounding waters best were the Ryukyu sailors. This is because they navigated between Naha and Fuzhou for approximately 500 years to promote diplomacy and trade with China. Their goal was to safely get to and from Fuzhou, and the Senkaku Islands were located on that route as a navigational marker. Therefore, the Senkaku Islands were indispensable navigational knowledge for these sailors and part of their geographical awareness. Of the people living in East Asia, the Ryukyu people knew the Senkaku Islands best.

Compared to this, Chinese sailors had limited opportunities to pass through Senkaku Island waters. It is true that the Chinese Emperor dispatched missions to recognize new Ryukyu kings. The boats carrying these emissaries also made the journey between Naha and Fuzhou by passing near the Senkaku Islands. But these ship voyages happened only when power passed to a new king, once every 20 years at most. As if to
symbolize this, the Ryukyu side sent navigational instructions or dispatched pilots for the Chinese sailors that would have to navigate between Fuzhou and Naha with the emperor’s emissaries. In other words, going to and from Ryukyu was difficult for the Chinese emissaries without support from the Ryukyu side.

But having confirmed the above, I would like to make another point. Claiming that the Senkaku Islands belonged to Ryukyu just because the Ryukyu sailors knew the islands and surrounding waters best is an absurd argument. The islands did not belong to anyone and were only indispensable to the sailors that passed through its surrounding waters.

3-2 Development of Uninhabited Islands in Modern Okinawa

I should also touch on the situation after Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879. Here, I would like to bring up the subject of developing uninhabited islands.

The Daito Islands (Minami Daito, Kita Daito, Oki Daito: Rasa Island) were uninhabited islands located approximately 370 km east of Okinawa. Spanish ships, Russian fleets, and American fleets had confirmed their existence, but had not taken specific measures to land on these islands and establish some kind of interest.

In 1885, six years after Okinawa Prefecture was created, the Japanese government ordered the prefectural governor of Okinawa to conduct a survey of the unoccupied Daito Islands. Along with dispatching six staff members to do an actual survey, the prefectural governor had a sign erected on the islands stating that they were under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. After this, private business owners continually filed requests with the prefectural and national governments stating that they would like to develop the Daito Islands. The person who actually ended up developing Daito was a man named Hanuemon Tamaoki (1838–1910). After making
the necessary preparations for development, Tamaoki had development personnel land in Minami Daito in 1900. He continually sent personnel to the island after this, starting the history of the Daito islands as inhabited islands. The development activities which began in Minami Daito eventually expanded to Kita Daito and Oki Daito (Rasa Island), creating a new frontier in the eastern sea of Okinawa. Naturally, these islands were part of Okinawa Prefecture.

Another example of uninhabited island development is actually the Senkaku Islands.

In 1885, the same year that Okinawa’s prefectural governor surveyed the Daito Islands under the Japanese government’s orders, the prefectural government dispatched a surveying team of six to the three main Senkaku Islands: Kuba-jima, Uotsuri-jima, and Kume-aka-shima. The survey team gathered information on the islands’ geography, plants, and the possibility of port locations and summarized these findings into reports. However, Okinawa didn’t erect a sign at that time claiming the islands as Okinawa Prefecture jurisdiction as it had in Minami-Daito.

In 1895, the Japanese Cabinet decided that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory, but it was a private business owner named Tatsushirou Koga (1856–1918) who started developing the islands based on this decision. Koga landed on the island in 1897 with initial development personnel, starting the history of the Senkaku Islands as inhabited islands. The islands became uninhabited again later because business proved sluggish, but we cannot ignore the fact that there was a history of people living and creating a community on these islands.

In other words, we should focus on the fact that in the modern period after Okinawa Prefecture was established, uninhabited islands were developed and a new frontier was created. Rather than suddenly limiting
the problem to territorial rights to the Senkaku Islands, we need to focus on
the uninhabited island strategy promoted by the newly created Okinawa
Prefecture to develop resources and the results of this strategy.

I am deliberately emphasizing this because when conflict breaks out
between two countries over the extent of sovereign territory or sovereign
waters, the parties making claims are limited for the most part to the
central governments of these countries. The circumstances of the area at
issue – in this case, Okinawa – tend to be overlooked. I am trying to say
that when considering what the Senkaku Islands mean to Okinawa, they are
clearly part of Okinawa’s history of developing uninhabited islands in the
modern period.

4. Arguments When Considering Future Issues

4-1 Will of the Majority in Okinawa

Related to this, I would like to touch on how some Chinese researchers
are calling into question the very fact of Japan’s jurisdiction over Okinawa
(Ryukyu). There are probably two bases for these arguments; the first
brings up China’s suzerainty over the Kingdom of Ryukyu. The other is the
fact that the Japanese government unilaterally claimed Ryukyu, completely
ignoring the wishes and opinions of the Chinese government. In other
words, China views this push forward to “Japanize Ryukyu” in a way that
ignored China’s position and wishes as a problematic event.

Of course, at the time, the Ryukyu side, which was subjected to this one-
sided imposition by the Japanese government, had contentions as well.
Although it was subservient to the two major nations of China and Japan,
Ryukyu wanted to continue existing as a small independent country that
wasn’t absorbed by either nation, and opposed Japan’s unilateral
absorption/annexation.
However, as I said before, the residents of Okinawa have accepted the reality that the islands that once formed the Ryukyu Kingdom are now part of Japan. And regardless of the fact that Japan, which lost the Pacific War, separated Okinawa and handed it over to American control, Okinawa campaigned to be returned to the country of Japan. Also, looking at the results of different public opinion polls, an overwhelming majority of Okinawa’s residents remain in favor of Okinawa being part of Japan.

The will of the majority in Okinawa is that, assuming Okinawa is part of Japan, they want to maintain Okinawa as an area with a distinct personality. This will is not something that was guided or forced by someone else, but what Okinawan residents have independently chosen.

I believe that we need to verify and evaluate past history by adequately taking into account this will of Okinawa’s residents.

4-2 The Stability of East Asia
At any cost, we must avoid destabilizing East Asia as a result of escalating Japanese-Chinese conflict over the Senkaku Islands and spreading parochial nationalism. This is because past history emphasizes the fact that instability in East Asia has a strong impact on Okinawa.

East Asia was destabilized from the early to mid-17th century by the disruption of regime changes in China, and Tokugawa Japan launched a military invasion of Ryukyu to consolidate its power over Ryukyu. In the latter half of the 19th century, modern Japan annexed Ryukyu within the unstable situation caused by the Western powers’ advance into East Asia. These two events were major incidents that would together decide Ryukyu’s fate.

Conversely, there were two periods when East Asia was stable: the 15th century, when Ryukyu prospered as a maritime trading nation and the latter
half of the 17th century to the 18th century, when it developed its heritage as a cultural nation.

I believe that these lessons are not limited to the past, but hold meaningful messages for the present.

4-3 Dialogue Required Between Japan and China

Okinawa has declared “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” and is expediting actions to realize this goal. For example, mutual understanding and stability in East Asia, the region most familiar to Okinawa, is an absolute prerequisite to achieve Okinawa’s vision of utilizing its characteristics for peaceful coexistence and openness in Asia and the world.

As everyone knows, the issues and contradictions of the Japan-U.S. alliance are concentrated in Okinawa. It is necessary to alleviate the excessive burden of hosting U.S. bases in Japan, which is borne by Okinawa alone, while preserving and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Actions toward alleviating the base burden to a level that the majority of prefectural residents can accept and striving to prevent the outbreak of base problems that shake the operation of the Japan-U.S. alliance are urgently required.

If a conflict over the Senkaku Islands were to escalate between Japan and China and expose a new threat to Okinawa’s periphery, this would definitely endanger Okinawa’s future. This would cause a worst-case scenario of adding new concerns and instability in the Senkaku Islands on top of the already existing base problem.

What should we do to prevent this from happening? There is only one answer.
Both Japan and China need to pursue a calm dialogue and strive for a peaceful resolution. These talks must be occasions for both countries to calmly understand the other party’s arguments and to develop logical criticisms and counter-criticisms, not occasions to one-sidedly make arguments. For example, Japan and China must be able to make objective judgments and considerations after disclosing and presenting the documents they each have regarding recognized historical facts, which support one basis for sovereignty claims.

The point I wish to make is that the Japanese government, even as it maintains its own principled position, should address China’s assertions, and the reasoning behind those assertions, with a sincere and open mind. The current situation, with China raising objections, sending patrol fleets to the Senkaku Islands and the surrounding waters, and turning demonstrations into everyday occurrences, has only strengthened my conviction that the Japanese government must enter into a dialogue with China.

I think that a round table discussion, where China and Japan can talk about each of their claims and the bases for these claims while retaining their own arguments, needs to be planned immediately. If third-party reasoning became necessary as dialogue continued, the parties could file a suit, for example, with the International Court of Justice.

5. Conclusion

So what should Okinawa do?

In general, China is one of the foreign countries that Okinawa’s residents feel close affinity towards. This is self-evident if you open a book on Okinawa’s history or culture. This view may be changing since Okinawans have seen the dynamic actions of modern China including the build-up of
military force and the patrol ship demonstrations on the Senkaku Islands and its surrounding waters. Even so, Okinawans still retain a sense of familiarity towards China.

Okinawa should take a proactive role of some sort to promote dialogue between Japan and China regarding the Senkaku Islands problem. Rather than Tokyo or Beijing always being the dialogue forum between Japan and China, I believe that it is important to encourage Japan and China to also hold these talks in Okinawa and Fuzhou. This is because Okinawa and Fuzhou are truly the key players in the East China Sea (East Sea) exchange route, where the Senkaku Islands are located. What is desired is for the Japan-China dialogue forum to be a continual place for dialogue, not a temporary event.

In any event, what efforts should Okinawa take to promote a Japan-China strategic partnership of mutual benefit and bring stability to East Asia, so that people of Okinawa do not become miserable? I believe that is the question.
[References]


III.

Summary of Symposium in
Washington, D.C.
Overview of Symposium

· Title 「REBALANCE TO ASIA, REFORCUS ON OKINAWA」
· Sponsor Okinawa Prefectural Government
· Time Tuesday, October 23, 2012
  9:00 AM – 1:00 PM
· Location Willard InterContinental Hotel, Washington D.C.
· Program 1) Panel Discussion
  Panelists:
  - The Honorable Hirokazu Nakaima,
    Governor of Okinawa Prefecture
  - Michael O’Hanlon,
    Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
  - Patrick M. Cronin,
    Senior Advisor, Center for a New American Security
  - Akio Takahara,
    Professor, The University of Tokyo
  - Narushige Michishita,
    Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
  Moderator:
  - Mike M. Mochizuki,
    Associate Professor, The George Washington University

2) Keynote Address
  - The Honorable Jim Webb,
    Senior U.S. Senator from Virginia

Master of Ceremonies:
  - Bill Brooks,
    Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University
1. Opening Remarks

Dr. Bill Brooks

This is the fortieth year since Okinawa was returned from U.S. to Japanese control. In a sense this conference could be called a commemorative event, marking Okinawa’s achievement of economic autonomy even as it has dealt with a lot of other issues. In an ideal world, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture would be coming to Washington to promote tourism and economic activity in Okinawa, but the reality is otherwise. Geopolitically, Okinawa is situated relatively close to China, with whom tensions have risen in connection with events in the East China Sea. In addition, the people of Okinawa are bearing an excessive burden due to the fact that their prefecture is host to 74 percent of the U.S. military presence in Japan. The aims of this conference are, first, to discuss Okinawa’s concerns, and second, to do some brainstorming about viable strategies for improving the current situation. Through this conference I hope we will not only arouse concern over the problems facing Okinawa but also reinvigorate the debate among the parties involved, in order to largely resolve the problem of military bases in Okinawa, as was promised 16 years ago.

Governor Nakaima

Since it was returned to Japan 40 years ago, Okinawa has built up a good relationship with the United States, through cultural and scholarly exchanges and the like, including exchanges of foreign students. Over the past decade, in particular, the United States and Okinawa have promoted scientific and technological research in Okinawa Prefecture. We continue
to have this kind of interaction, and Okinawa’s economy is heading in a positive direction. However, the people of Okinawa Prefecture are greatly dissatisfied with the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, and there are a number of security-related issues that must be resolved. There are many topics, including the relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine base, that deserve to be addressed at this conference, and as governor I want to achieve a resolution as soon as possible. I hope you’ll give us your kind attention.

**Symposium on Okinawa Held in Washington, D.C.**

Photo by: Okinawa Prefectural Government
2. Panelist Statements

**Governor Nakaima**

To begin, I would like to explain about the Futenma Marine air base and the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance. More than a decade ago, the U.S. and Japanese governments determined that the Futenma base should be relocated, but since then there’s been absolutely no progress. Okinawa is already excessively burdened with U.S. military bases, so relocating the Futenma base elsewhere in Okinawa Prefecture would not be a solution to Okinawa’s problems. The Henoko district of the city of Nago has been proposed as a relocation site, but moving the base there would cause environmental problems, and the mayors of various local communities have voiced opposition to such a move. The Futenma base is right in the middle of a city, and we’re also dealing with the problem of noise from Osprey aircraft, which have recently begun taking off from there. The base must be relocated as soon as possible.

Regarding the second issue, my own belief is that the U.S.-Japan alliance is very important, but the people of Okinawa have a variety of opinions about it. There’s no consensus of opinion among the citizens of the prefecture. However, I think most of them feel that the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important than ever, in light of the current security situation in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Dr. Michael O’Hanlon**

**Suitable Alternatives to Relocating the Futenma Base**

Within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Okinawa is being asked to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, and that is a serious problem for the people of Okinawa. On the other hand, the United States is trying to maintain an overall balance of power in the Asia-Pacific in order
to preserve stability in the region. That effort requires a certain amount of capability. Today I’d like to present a plan that Mike Mochizuki and I have devised, as one option for resolving some of these issues.

1) First, Mike and I would propose that roughly half of the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa return to the United States, probably to California. This would reduce costs for the United States and should help with the commercial and human development of Okinawa. So we would bring half the Marines from Okinawa to California, or perhaps Hawaii. This should not be more complicated or costly than building barracks and facilities on Guam.

2) Have the United States, together with the Japanese government, purchase one or two large ships, of the type referred to as LMSR vessels or another type of ferry ship, load them with equipment for at least a battalion or up to a brigade of Marines, and station them in Japanese waters. If there were a crisis anywhere near Japan, those ships could sail immediately to the location of the crisis, and then the Marines from California could fly over to meet them. This is something the United States is already doing in various parts of the world, so we know how to do it. It does entail some costs because you have to buy the ships and you have to buy the equipment, but it should be no more expensive than the Guam and Henoko relocation plan.

3) In keeping with political reality in Japan and the strong desire of the Okinawan people, we would have the United States military quickly return Futenma to the Japanese. We would also cancel the Henoko plan. As partial compensation for the return of Futenma and to provide the Marine Corps with helicopter capabilities on Okinawa, we propose building a small-scale helipad in the northern training area or Camp Schwab.

4) We would have any remaining Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft that still needed to operate on Okinawa use the Kadena airfield. We propose relocating some of the Air Force aircraft in Kadena to other
parts of Japan, perhaps Kyushu, and having day-to-day operations conducted there instead.

5) Finally, we suggest building a second runway at Naha airport. This runway would be used for commercial purposes in peacetime, which would assist Okinawa’s economic development. But the Naha airfields would be available to U.S. and Japanese forces in the event of a crisis.

**Deployment of Ospreys**

I believe the Osprey has become a safe aircraft. However, this is not to in any way downplay the concerns of the Okinawan people concerning the Futenma airfield. And this is not to blame the U.S. Marine Corps for the fact that the base is located next to a city. Okinawa is a small island, and cities have grown up around the airfields. That happens in the United States as well, but we’ve closed a lot of bases near major urban areas. In Okinawa that’s not the case. So I understand why the Okinawan people have doubts about the Osprey and airfield safety.

But let me now also defend the safety of the Osprey. There have been some terrible crashes of the Osprey in its history, including fatal accidents, and they have gotten a lot of attention. There were aerodynamic problems that were not well understood at the time, and the pilots had a difficult time navigating. Well, the Marine Corps has learned. The Marine Corps takes very seriously the safety of the people in those airplanes and of anyone living near the airfields that might be used for the Osprey. The latest statistics show 1.94 serious crashes for every 100,000 flight hours with the Osprey. That is less than the average for all Marine Corps aircraft. It’s somewhat higher than for the CH-46 helicopter, and of course it could get worse. So the Osprey would appear to be a safe aircraft, but no airplane is perfectly safe and no airfield inside of a city is optimally suited for flight operations. We would prefer to keep our military bases away from populations when possible, so the basic principle of continuing to operate
the Futenma airfield is not ideal, but that’s not meant to criticize the Osprey, which does appear to be a safe aircraft, relatively speaking.

**Dr. Patrick Cronin**

**Possible Immediate Actions to Ease the Burden on Okinawans**

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the most important alliance for security in the Asia-Pacific. But we have to understand that a perspective concerned with public safety in Okinawa is very different from the perspective held by the Pentagon, which has to protect its soldiers and make sure that we have a capable force, one that’s integrated with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. So I just want to make sure we understand the stakes here for national security, before we start calibrating very finely this move and that move about how to do this.

I have to salute the efforts of people in both Japan and the United States who have tried to offer solutions to the Futenma base relocation issue. Many alliance management issues have been resolved through realignment, but the fact that Futenma is in too crowded an area and that Okinawa bears a disproportionate share of the burden for bases in Japan is a big remaining problem.

That brings me to the Henoko relocation plan. The best thing you can say about the Henoko plan is that the two governments have actually agreed on it. However, the following four points must be considered.

1) Relocation to Henoko would not improve operational capability over Futenma.
2) The Henoko plan could be very costly.
3) The Henoko plan would impose a permanent cost on the environment.
4) For future operational needs, there has to be a longer runway to make sure that you can conduct the full panoply of military operations.
I don’t think Henoko is the solution. But before we declare the Henoko plan dead or declare that it’s going forward, we have await the result of the U.S. presidential election, because you need to know who the U.S. government officials are who will be around for the next four years to deal with the Futenma issue.

Dr. O’Hanlon and Dr. Mochizuki have presented a number of specific proposals, but we ultimately have to put things back in the strategic context. Will the United States and Japan be able to continue to project power in the seas where our power is now being pushed back through anti-access and area denial, growing capabilities and military modernization, and a potentially changing Chinese strategy? If a conflict erupts, it could change the disposition of U.S. forces in the region and Japan’s role in the region as well. So before we do anything permanent, we’d better make sure we’ve got the right plan.

**Joint Use of Existing Runways in Japan**

Rather than build a new long runway for an installation that will replace the Futenma base, I’m in favor of pursuing joint military and civilian use of a runway at a Self-Defense Forces base. The Center for a New American Security is about to release a report on civil-military dual use at Yokota. The dual use concept would open up the possibility of contingency use of Japan’s civilian airports to deal with a crisis or natural disaster. There has already been a U.S. military aircraft landing exercise at Haneda Airport in Tokyo as part of disaster-relief contingency training. If you’ve only got one airfield and then something goes wrong at that airfield, it can be a major impediment. Strategically, it makes sense to have access to more airfields; it gives you greater flexibility.
Ospreys

The Osprey is an aircraft, so unlike a helicopter, you can fly it multiple days in a row. You could take the Osprey and do training missions for weeks at a time elsewhere in Japan, which would relieve the burden on Futenma, and it would be still good for training. But ultimately you’ve got to have your assets ready in a position where they can all operate together, so you can’t disperse them too far.

Dr. Narushige Michishita

The Current Situation in Asia Compared to the Cold War Era

Here are some similarities between the Cold War situation in Asia and the situation right now.

- In the 1970s the Soviet Union started to undertake a major military buildup. Now China is undertaking a major military buildup, particular in its naval capabilities.
- The Soviet Union drew two defense lines in an effort to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a sanctuary. Now China is trying to turn the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea into a sanctuary and in order to do so is drawing two defense lines, called the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain.
- In the 1970s the Soviet Union deployed a large number of submarines, bombers, and surface ships to protect its defense lines. Today China is deploying a large number of submarines, bombers, and surface ships to protect its own defense lines.
- To counter the rise of the Soviet Union in this region, in the 1970s the United States developed what was called the Maritime Strategy. Now the United States is developing what’s called air-sea battle to cope with the rise of China.
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There are, however, also differences between the Cold War environment and the current strategic environment. Some of these differences are good news for Japan.

- During the cold war, the Kuril Islands, which constituted a strategic barrier, were under the control of the Soviet Union. Now the same role is played by the Nansei Islands, which include Okinawa, but Japan controls these islands.
- China’s military power is inferior to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and also to the current military capabilities of the United States and Japan. China doesn’t have strategic nuclear capabilities comparable to that of the Soviet Union.
- The United States and the Soviet Union were in a serious confrontation which we called the Cold War, but the United States and China are not involved in such a confrontation.

On the other hand, some of the differences between the Cold War environment and the current environment amount to bad news for Japan.

- During the Cold War the Soviet Union had only three exit routes to the western Pacific, but China has from nine to eleven exit routes to the western Pacific. This makes it hard for us to blockade Chinese naval activities in the region.
- During the Cold War, the theaters of war were limited to air, sea, and ground battles, but now we are talking about battles in cyberspace and outer space as well. This has made the situation and the nature of the competition more complex.
- During the Cold War, Europeans and Asians were competing with the Soviet Union together, but now the Europeans don’t care much about the rise of China as a military power. Some European countries are even willing to sell arms to China.
The United States and the Soviet Union had learned from the Cuban missile crisis, the Yom Kippur War, and other such events, so they knew the rules. But China doesn’t know how to play the game.

Finally, China’s economic performance is much better than that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As a result, in the past decade, Chinese military expenditures have increased by a staggering 170 percent, whereas Japanese defense expenditures have declined. U.S. military expenditures are certain to decline in the future.

**Future Competition between the U.S.-Japan Alliance and China**

There are two scenarios for future competition between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China:

1) One is a low-end scenario, in which China will keep conducting guerilla warfare at sea, and we will keep seeing skirmishes between the alliance and China’s military. This is the more likely scenario. The continued presence of forward-deployed U.S. as well as Japanese forces would be very important, and the role of Okinawa would remain important.

2) There is also a high-end scenario in which we will confront China in a high-intensity situation. In this scenario the air-sea battle concept proposed by the U.S. government might become more useful.

**Dr. Akio Takahara**

**Senkaku Islands**

The Okinawan people have had a very close relationship with China and the Chinese, in terms of economic exchanges, cultural exchanges, and kinship. There has been a sense of affinity with China and the Chinese among the Okinawan people. However, the recent violent demonstrations against Japan and the Japanese in China are very shocking, and they have shaken the sense of affinity that Okinawan people have had toward China.
In addition, the Chinese government has extended its countermeasures to the economic and the cultural realms, and this has inflicted economic damage on Okinawans, for whom tourism is a very important industry. As of September 26 Okinawa’s tourist industry had already suffered economic losses amounting to roughly 400 million yen.

So for Japanese people in general, the verdict on base realignment or the relocation of bases will be determined by whether it reinforces the capabilities of the alliance.

**Governor Nakaima**

**Views Expressed by Other Panelists**

Dr. O’Hanlon talked about the Ospreys. However, because the Futenma base is located in an urban residential area, it’s unreasonable to be operating Ospreys there. As governor, I’ve made this point to the Japanese government, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. State Department. It’s absolutely essential that the Futenma base be moved out of the middle of the city as soon as possible. Otherwise, incidents and accidents will occur that will create problems for the U.S.-Japan and Okinawa-U.S. relationships.

As to whether this aircraft is technically safe or not, the people of Okinawa still have a lot of questions about that. The public’s concern certainly hasn’t been dispelled. The Japanese government has announced that the Ospreys had been determined to be safe. If they’re really safe, then let’s have the Futenma air base moved to the mainland and have the Ospreys deployed all over Japan. Since the Osprey has such a long flight range and such high speed, then deploy them on the mainland, but not in Okinawa.
The topic of China has also come up, and there have been different opinions about this. With regard to the Senkaku Islands in particular, Okinawa’s prefectural government basically agrees with the position taken by the Japanese government. Okinawans have longstanding historical and personal connections to China, but the issue of the Senkakus has to be addressed on a different level. I feel the territorial issue is beyond the scope of what a prefecture can deal with. We have connections to China that have been cultivated for a long time, including scholarly, cultural, artistic, and commercial connections, and we would like to try to sustain those connections.

3. Panel Discussion and Q & A

Q. (Andrew Oros: Associate Professor, Washington College) The Chinese say the Ryukyu Islands are an ancient part of China and that Japan sort of took over these islands illegally. I wonder how Okinawan people see that issue. Are Okinawan people more concerned now because they see reports that China seems to be claiming Okinawan territory, not just the Senkakus?

A. (Gov. Nakaima) People in Okinawa feel a strong affinity with and have a long historical relationship with China. However, China is a different country, because we’re Japanese. We have absolutely no intention of becoming part of China. As to China’s assertion that Okinawa is part of China, the claim is unreasonable. Rather than feeling threatened, it’s a matter of common sense.

A. (Dr. Takahara) The assertion that Okinawa is part of China is not the official position of the Chinese government, and it’s surprising that the Chinese government allows this kind of talk to go on. What are they aiming for by allowing such claims to be made? As many of you know, there’s been an intense dispute between the hardliners and the moderates, and this dispute is reflected in the way China’s
behavior has evolved over the Senkaku issue this time. General Zhu Chenghu, who became famous when he mentioned that China has the capability to send missiles to Los Angeles, made some comments that were carried by the People’s Net on September 5, 2012, about the purchasing of three Senkaku islands by the Japanese government. He said there are two different interpretations in China.

1) The first is that it was an open provocation to China by the Japanese government.

2) The other view is that the Japanese government was acting to prevent Tokyo Governor Ishihara from purchasing the islands, so it was actually an act intended to stabilize the situation.

Zhu Chenghu himself was inclined to the latter view. And from what he said, we can see that as of September 5, there was a substantially moderate view within Beijing about this situation. But we also know that hardliners had been conducting this vicious anti-Japanese campaign since the summer of 2011, and it has had a very broad and deep impact on the public view of Japan among the Chinese. The general view in Japan is that the recent anti-Japanese campaign is linked to the power struggle going on in the lead-up to the Chinese Communist Party congress. Whenever the administration’s power base is not solid, they tend to take a tough policy toward Japan. So our hope now is for the next leader, Xi Jinping, to consolidate his power.

While the hardliners are prevailing at this point, what they’ve been doing is not only to reach into the economic realm and the cultural realm, they are also sending maritime agency vessels around the Senkakus, and this is extremely dangerous. If there is an accident it can easily escalate. If the Japanese conceded under such pressure or shows of might by the Chinese, I think it would send a very wrong
message to the Chinese. This would have a direct impact on what’s going on in the South China Sea, too. So this is not the time to show any sign of weakness; we have to uphold our position.

A. (Dr. Michishita) The government of Japan recently decided to purchase the ownership rights to three of the five islands constituting the Senkaku Islands, but prior to that, part of the Senkaku Islands had always been owned by the government of Japan. This purchase of three islands was actually an additional purchase, not something brand new. The Japanese media used the term nationalization, which had a negative connotation, as if the Japanese government had confiscated three islands from somebody else. We have to be very careful how we use words, and we have to learn how to be sophisticated in presenting ourselves and explaining our actions.

Q. (Mr. Yamaguchi, audience member) Not long ago in Okinawa two American airmen allegedly assaulted a local Okinawan lady. Dr. Cronin, I appreciate your argument for contingency plans and longer runways and so on, but I am more concerned about Okinawan people’s basic civil rights. To pay attention to this kind of social issue is more important, I feel.

A. (Dr. Cronin) I’m not sure the gentleman understood my comment in the context in which I intended it. I was critiquing the length of the runway proposed at Henoko. I wasn’t suggesting lengthening the runway there or even on Okinawa. As for civil rights, these heinous crimes need to be fully prosecuted. We have a Status of Forces Agreement now that allows for crimes to be fully prosecuted under Japanese law, and that’s the right thing to do. It’s not a choice between law and order and national security, they’re both important. The Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. armed forces are there for the same reason, to protect the people of Japan and the United States and to advance the peace and prosperity of the region. That’s why the
governor is here, and my proposals for a more politically sustainable arrangement are needed. The real problem we have on Futenma is so important because we have to have politically sustainable bases.

Q. (Sheila Smith: Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations) If you think about a more sustainable way in which U.S. forces can be stationed in Japan, I wonder whether you think that the sharing of bases by the SDF and U.S. forces would bring a more stable outcome over the long term, and if perceptions in Okinawa about the Self-Defense Forces are accurate.

A. (Gov. Nakaima) It’s just my personal opinion, but I think the U.S.-Japan alliance is going to become more and more important to Japan and Okinawa. Meanwhile, though, U.S. military bases exert a very heavy impact on Okinawa. Even so, I suspect that the greater part of the military base issue could perhaps be resolved as an internal matter, because it’s a question of how Japan as a whole will bear this burden. As to the joint use of bases by the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military, I suspect that approach is being considered. From the standpoint of stability, safety, and also control over the bases, instead of having Okinawa deal directly with the U.S. military, it seems more natural for Okinawa to deal with the Self-Defense Forces or the Japanese government. The issue of U.S. military bases should be addressed at the national level.

Q. (Unidentified audience member) The Chinese approach at the moment is to try and impose their views by force or by threat of force, so isn’t there an aspect of the alliance that should seek to somehow address this broader issue? From the Chinese perspective, they have to go through straits between Japanese islands to reach the western Pacific. Are there ways in which rules of the road can be established to deal with this?
A. (Dr. Takahara) We all have to try and avoid falling into a security dilemma. Personally, I don’t think that we can contain the military rise of China, so we have to find a way to live with a militarily rising China. I would say that a trilateral dialogue on security issues, with Japan, China, and the United States, is necessary.

A. (Dr. Cronin) The signal change in the region is the rise of China—its rapid economic growth and military modernization. We all support the rise of China’s middle class and the growing trade. Last night’s presidential debate demonstrated that both our presidential candidates, although still wary, desire a more workable cooperative relationship with the rising China. But we can’t say we’re going to completely satisfy the Chinese regardless of their behavior, regardless of any scenario. So we do have to manage the rules of the road, build the trade, and consider putting energy on the agenda in terms of Japan and China and the United States. We could try to assure China that they will get access to these critical resources for their economy, on which we all depend. Yes, this could lead to a security dilemma, which we’re trying to avert, even while we're trying to responsibly hedge and protect against uncertainty.

A. (Dr. O’Hanlon) I’m wondering if there is a conversation worth having about Japan offering to give the Senkakus to China, and Japan getting an agreement from China that there aren’t going to be new discussions in the next decade about Okinawa or any other island, and there’s a recognition that these islands in and of themselves are unimportant for anything except symbolic reasons. I only say this because I admire Japanese people so much that I actually think Japan is one of the few countries on earth capable even in theory of doing this. I sense that, as an American, my country would never be interested in doing anything similar about any territories it might have once controlled. It’s only out of my deep admiration for the Japanese,
and my understanding of how far they’ve come to try and make peace with their neighbors, that I even put the idea on the table.

A. (Dr. Cronin) We have to be very mindful that we’re sitting here in Washington, D.C., talking about the sovereignty of other countries, and I know Dr. O’Hanlon, in presenting this provocative idea, knows that.

If you look at the cost of the current territorial disputes in the East China Sea, you can put billion-dollar price tags on the cost to business in Japan and in China. There are a lot of costs and not a lot of gain at the moment, so maybe a more cooperative framework could be feasible. We should be very wary of proposing where that ends up.

Q. (Unidentified audience member) My kids went to elementary school right next to the Futenma airbase, and I can’t understand Japan’s objection to relocating part or all of the base or to another part of Japan. Especially now, with the rise of China, when there’s more enthusiasm for the U.S.-Japan alliance, it just never seems to come up in negotiations between the U.S. and Okinawa.

A. (Gov. Nakaima) The question of why people in other areas of Japan wouldn’t welcome the U.S. military is probably a difficult philosophical issue for Japanese people. Please go ahead and ask them about it. It’s not a question that I can answer.

A. (Dr. Michishita) If you put yourself in the position of mayors and governors of different prefectures and cities, it would be very hard for them to accept a deal to bring the bases and U.S. forces into their areas. Many municipalities in Japan are suffering from economic difficulties and aging problems, and while it might be a good idea economically for those municipalities to accept U.S. bases, if that
results in accidents and incidents, who takes responsibility? Unless there is a dire need to bring in U.S. forces, it would be very hard for heads of those cities and prefectures to accept such a deal.

A. (Dr. Takahara) I can only state my common-sense view that the “not in my backyard” phenomenon is very strong. No U.S. bases, no SDF bases, and no nuclear power plants in my back yard. The sense of threat to our national security is not that high, so human security comes first.

A. (Dr. Cronin) Okinawa has a disproportionate burden, absolutely. But it’s not just the not-in-my-backyard syndrome; it’s that the real estate in Okinawa is geographically strategic. You don’t just operate Marines separately from air power or naval power, they have to operate together. That’s why the U.S. Marines are training Ground Self-Defense Forces to be able to help defend Japan’s territories in the southwest island group. The more you move north, the farther you’re moving away from the challenged area. Okinawa is in a unique geographically strategic position. So it’s not just my-backyard syndrome—it’s history, it’s geography, it’s military requirements, costs, and politics, as well.

Q. (Unidentified audience member) As you know, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has spoken courageously about the dispute in the East China Sea. As for the overseas Chinese, there have been demonstrations everywhere. Last month there were demonstrations outside the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and there have been others in California and the Midwest. Also in the South Seas and Southeast Asia. So I think there is a problem for us, and maybe you should do some anthropological research.

A. (Dr. Takahara) I think the East China Sea Peace Initiative proposal made by President Ma is a very constructive one; we pay a lot of
attention to the content. And I do think that it depends a lot on mainland China, but Japan and China and perhaps Taiwan should agree on a consensus which is not much different from President Ma’s proposal. I think we should agree to disagree about sovereignty issues, but we can talk about other issues. For the Taiwanese the most important issue is fishery and the lack of a fishery agreement between Japan and Taiwan. We’ve been negotiating that a long time but we haven’t come to any conclusion yet. We can also agree that we, or all three parties, should try to maintain the situation that we have maintained for the past 40 years, since 1972.

Q. (TV Tokyo Correspondent) I would like to know, Gov. Nakaima, what you and Okinawan citizens think about the idea of reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution to allow Japan to have a standing army. Do you think that would help or hinder this refocus on Okinawa and the rebalancing of our troops in the region?

A. (Gov. Nakaima) Concerning Article 9, I don’t really know. The question was whether, apart from the debate about the Constitution in Tokyo, any discussion is taking place in Okinawa, is that right? And if I’m opposed to revising Article 9 or what is Okinawa’s perspective on Article 9? I believe the discussion of Article 9 is nothing less than an issue for the entire nation of Japan.

Q. (Maeshiro Mieko, Okinawa Kai of Washington D.C.) My question is, how can the public in Japan understand Okinawa’s situation? Isn’t there a way to motivate Japanese citizens to share Okinawa’s burden?

A. (Dr. Michishita) I think Japanese people understand the burden, and that’s why the government as well as the people have tried to seek alternative options, but they have failed to realize an alternative solution or put such an idea into practice. I think what’s important is
to keep coming up with viable alternatives, and try to get together and make it a reality.

A. (Dr. Mochizuki) One of the things that I notice as an observer of the Japanese debate is that a lot of ideas emerge in the United States, but the Japanese security community doesn’t come up with any ideas. And it seems to me that Professor Takahara may be right that there isn’t a real sense of an acute security problem. There seems to be a real obligation on the part of the Japanese security studies community to think about this seriously.

Q. (Shiho Kenkasia, Woodrow Wilson Center) The United States will be holding an election soon. South Korea will have an election in December; a major regime change in China is moving ahead; Japan is expected to have an election within the next few weeks. How will this affect negotiations regarding the bases in Okinawa? I’m interested in knowing whether you have any views on what kind of Japanese leadership will be a better negotiator on behalf of Okinawa.

A. (Gov. Nakaima) Regarding the possibility of a change of government, if the question is how will Okinawa’s security issues and relations with the U.S. military change, it doesn’t really seem to change. In discussions of national security among Japanese people in general, it seems very hard to get past the conventional beliefs.

A. (Dr. Cronin) Japan has had a series of short-term prime ministers, almost like a national referendum. There’s no continuity; there’s no political will to be able to implement anything really hard. My biggest concern about Korea’s election is that it will lead to a government that will seek a new engagement policy, a sunshine policy potentially, with North Korea, and that North Korea will again exploit the seams in policy interests among Tokyo, Seoul, and
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Washington, creating the potential for a new crisis. On the other hand, a change of government in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea does provide a fresh opportunity for seeking a common Japanese and Korean roadmap, and also with the United States, and for seeking new engagement with China.

Q. (Victor Okim, U.S.-Japan Research) Three entities are very intimately involved with the Okinawa military base issue: Okinawa, Tokyo, and Washington. I have heard many suggestions about how to integrate the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military, but I think the basic issue is really that Naha, Tokyo, and Washington should be talking to each other simultaneously. Otherwise you’ll be going around in circles. My question is, is there any strategic solution to this triangular issue? On the military base issue, I suggest a national referendum, to see what the whole country will come up with.

A. (Gov. Nakaima) Regarding three-party talks, if that’s possible then I think it would be the best way. However, with issues of national defense, negotiations usually take place between the national governments, and dialog with the local area comes at the very end. In Japan, it’s difficult to incorporate the concerns of local governments into a dialog with another country, but all three parties should be coordinating things to the extent they can go beyond the established pattern.

A. (Dr. O’Hanlon) There’s an element of nervousness that I feel about American treaty commitments to Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands. This country is not in the mood to have another unnecessary war. I don’t think the United States would liberate the Senkakus for Japan by a Marine operation. If China did something so stupid as to send a paratroop company to take the Senkakus, the thing to do is to respond with economic sanctions, but never to take it back by force. It’s not
worth it. The treaty does not require any specific American military response. There are all sorts of options, and American policymakers, along with Japanese counterparts, would have to consider the most prudent response. If the Chinese were to do something stupid in the Senkakus, we would have to respond. There are a lot of other things we can do that may even be disproportionate, and I would favor a strong response. I just don’t think it should be a military one.

Q. (James Schoff, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) The central problem we face is how to close Futenma as soon as possible. I get a strong sense from listening to the governor that speed is very important, and if speed is really important, then we already have the agreement supported by the LDP and the DPJ to reduce the Marine presence in Okinawa by 9,000, provide for early land returns and over the medium and longer terms, and relocate operations to a more remote, less populated area. I wonder if there is room for a political discussion to begin on implementation of the plan and for bringing Okinawa more into the discussion of how it’s implemented.

A. (Gov. Nakaima) This plan was created by the Japanese and U.S. governments. The question is whether it’s capable of being carried out. In our view, it would take a very long time, probably 20 years, to carry out the plan. On paper it looks okay, but if they listen to Okinawa’s side of the story, they should realize how difficult it would be to carry out.

Q. (Ben Self, Center for Strategic and International Studies) Professor Michishita, I really enjoyed your analysis. Your argument is that we need to preserve the forward-deployed U.S. capabilities in Okinawa in order to maintain deterrence and preserve stability in the sea area around the Senkakus. Would you say that the plan that Professors Mochizuki and O’Hanlon have put forward for moving Marines from Okinawa and maybe
back to the mainland United States shouldn’t proceed, because it undermines deterrence?

A. (Dr. Michishita) The two gentlemen are not talking about bringing all the Marines to the continental U.S., they are talking about leaving the 31st Marine expeditionary unit in Okinawa, which would be enough to respond to low-intensity conflicts. I don’t think my idea and their ideas contradict each other, and I regard their ideas to be credible and realistic.

Q. (Katsuko Kudaka Lee, Okinawa-America Ryukyu Culture Association) Is there any roadmap for solving this problem over the Senkaku Islands?

A. (Dr. Michishita) The issue is, what is Japanese defense policy, and how should the U.S. and Japan be working together defending Japan as well as maintaining the peace in the region. We talk about the base issue, but there is no right answer. We have to keep looking for a way to strike a good balance between maintaining credible deterrents and capabilities to respond to various kinds of contingencies, from low-intensity to high-intensity conflicts, and reducing the burden on Okinawa.

A. (Dr. Cronin) I’m not sure that there is one roadmap right now, but senior Japanese officials, including former Tokyo Governor Ishihara, have different ideas about how to lower tension. On one hand, there are already agreements with China, for instance, on fisheries, and yet there are no enforcement mechanisms, so there are real challenges to implementing an agreement. I think it’s going to take leadership on the part of the Chinese and the Japanese, and it’s going to take a strong U.S.-Japan alliance with very capable armed forces in both countries to maintain deterrence. It’s going to take a focus on
economic agendas that are the overlapping cooperative area with China.

Real people are getting hurt by a fixation on a territory that, as Michael O’Hanlon suggested, is not really the core issue for the peace and prosperity of the region. But we have to be very mindful of the role that our military forces play. The historic bargain of the U.S.-Japan alliance has Japan providing bases in exchange for America’s protection of its territory. Part of the bargain is for the U.S. to protect the Japanese. Even if nobody in Washington wants to look to a military scenario to protect those islands, deterrence remains a part of that calculus. Because if you look weak to China, you go down the road toward a security dilemma.

A. (Dr. Takahara) On the citizens’ level, a fundamental problem is that the Japanese people and the Chinese people don’t share a common-sense consensus. The information flow is being controlled in China by a very powerful government-owned party agency. And in both countries there is the problem of a populist and sensationalistic media which really distorts reality. The people of Okinawa have offered to host a discussion outside the political sphere, where academics, not only from Japan and China but perhaps from Taiwan and the United States, can sort out our arguments. On the governmental level, I think we should quickly move to establish a consensus, and in order to seize the opportunity we have to start our preparations now.

A. (Dr. O’Hanlon) There are a lot of patient people in this alliance, on both sides, who have worked very hard to try to resolve this question for a long time, and I admire them and I commend them. I think the deal that’s been proposed is pretty good, but it doesn’t seem to be taking, so perhaps it’s worth trying to find a way to modify it. The
military base issue is beginning to make the U.S.-Japan alliance look like a weak alliance. This is frankly not a worthy place for the world’s historically greatest bilateral alliance to stay mired forever. I think we should give it one more try, and if that fails, get on with something that doesn’t require a major new construction project on Okinawa. I’m just not convinced that the Japanese Constitution or Japanese politics are going to make it possible to ever follow through, even if we did sit down in a triangular negotiation from the outset.

The final point I would make is that Okinawa is just about the only growing prefecture in Japan, or one of the only growing ones, and it’s not that hard to figure out why: it’s beautiful and it’s warm. We have to recognize we have too many American bases on such a small piece of land. Okinawa is prime real estate in a densely populated country, and it’s just not sustainable to keep as many forces there as we’ve had. So while I like the plan that’s been devised, which is better than the status quo, and maybe it’s worth one more try at convincing local populations and governments to support it, I think we have to recognize that we’ve got to reduce our footage on Okinawa.

**Governor Nakaima**

**Comments at the Close of the Panel Discussion**

Thank you, everyone, for your views. The final questioner asked whether there’s a roadmap concerning the Senkakus. I, too, am hoping for one. Right now we’re waiting to see if one will emerge. I think the roadmap is something that will be worked out between the governments. Okinawa’s role has not yet become clear, but we’d like to help.

About half of today’s discussion has focused on the Futenma base. Though this may appear to be a minor issue, this is a very big issue. Japan’s prime ministers and ruling parties come and go, and the situation in
the world is quickly changing, but for the past 16 years this issue has only been addressed with technical and bureaucratic measures, so ultimately we’ve ended up where we are. Because it’s been treated as if it were a minor issue, efforts to resolve it have devolved into a technical discussion. This issue affects social stability in Okinawa and the settlement of issues involving U.S.-Japan security arrangements. If you take the attitude that a done deal can’t be altered even a little bit, then this issue absolutely can’t be resolved. If you’re willing to resolve it by political means, I believe it can be resolved immediately.

4. **Keynote Address and Q & A**

**Senator Jim Webb**

I would like to begin by expressing my own personal regret over the recent incidents in Okinawa. I have been connected to the people of Japan and the people of Okinawa since 1969 when I was a Marine on Okinawa on my way to Vietnam. I’ve been back as a journalist, as a government official, as a novelist, as a guest of the government. As Secretary of the Navy I returned the Gokokuji bell to the people of Okinawa, which had either been given to or taken in 1853 by Commodore Matthew Perry on his first visit to Okinawa.
The people of Okinawa suffered greatly during World War II. Okinawa was probably the most grievous campaign the American military was involved in, and the highest casualties by far were suffered by the people of Okinawa. Even so, they have been very accommodating and gracious to the United States military. Today I would like to explain my own view about the United States presence in that part of the world, why it is important, how Okinawa fits into that, and what we need to do to create greater harmony and a continuing relationship between Japan, the United States, and the Okinawan people.

The Korean Peninsula, where the interests of three great powers—Russia, China, and Japan—intersect, is very important to the stability of Northeast Asia. History has shown what can happen when one of these countries asserts its interests beyond the measures of stability in the region. Since World War II, the United States has served as the vital and irreplaceable guarantor of stability in the region. The United States-Japan security
relationship and our economic relationship and political similarities have been a key to our ability to provide stability in the region.

American bases have served as an essential element of the approach toward regional security. From our perspective, and I think that of most people in Japan, the bases in Okinawa have been the strongest component of the United States-Japan joint security relationship. With the emerging importance in the last couple of years of conflicts over sovereignty in the Senkakus and the South China Sea, the bases in Okinawa have validated their importance. We need to understand that if we do not act in a strong manner, we could see the kind of imbalances that have caused serious problems in this region again and again. That’s one of the reasons I started talking about the Senkaku issue about fifteen years ago.

The people on Okinawa have borne the burden of the American military presence now for more than 60 years. We need to continually examine how we can continue this relationship and still be sensitive to the wellbeing of the people in Okinawa. The Japanese and American governments have worked very hard over the past sixteen years to reduce these burdens, potentially through relocation of bases inside Okinawa and out of Okinawa to places like Guam. I recommended relocation of some of the bases on Okinawa to Guam in 1974 in the report that I wrote as a military planner for the government of Guam.

We have been discussing the issue of bases on Okinawa now for fifteen years. I believe strongly we’ve reached a point where this debate is going to have to end. We need to resolve this so we can move forward in a way that is timely, cost effective, and that addresses the need for harmony with the people of Okinawa. If done properly, a readjustment of our bases on Okinawa, and from Okinawa, will provide continuing economic benefit to the people of Okinawa and will benefit the American-Japanese security
relationship. It will contribute to the stability of East Asia and to continuing economic growth and political emergence of the region.

Let me lay out four things that I believe we should be looking at.

(1) **Bases on Guam**

I believe that we should be relocating portions of the bases to Guam. We’ve been working very hard since I’ve been in the Senate to do this. In the United States Department of Defense, however, on the issue of moving military bases around, it’s very difficult to get a decision. For every possible solution there are probably twenty recommendations. Another problem on Guam is the Environmental Protection Agency requiring detailed environmental impact statements, which has slowed this process down and could slow it down another three to five years. I believe that the American government needs to understand the frustrations that have been experienced in Japan and in Okinawa as this issue has dragged out.

(2) **Resolution of the Futenma Issue**

I know there has been a lot of discussion today on this point. I made a recommendation in 2010 regarding the Futenma base issue. It’s one recommendation among three or four other recommendations. We need to find one that can be implemented, with the least burden possible on the people of Okinawa.

(3) **Crimes by U.S. Military Personnel Stationed in Okinawa**

In the long term, we need to work on the issue of local crime with respect to the American military presence on Okinawa in a way that shows respect and alleviates the concerns of the Okinawan people. One thing that could be done is to explain to American military people what happens when you go to a Japanese prison.
Curfew for U.S. Military Personnel in Okinawa

American commanders have put a curfew on all the American military stationed in Okinawa—you stay on your base after eleven o’clock until five o’clock. I think that’s the wrong way to approach this. I believe that the more interaction that the American military can have with the people of Okinawa, the higher the respect, and the more understanding on both sides will take place. In 2001 I was sent to Okinawa by a magazine to interview thinkers, academic leaders, and business leaders about how the Americans and the people of Okinawa interact. I learned that the people of Okinawa have been welcoming people from other lands for more than five hundred years. I think they still have a welcoming culture.

I hope that as we work to resolve these issues we can understand the vital importance that Okinawa plays in terms of the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan, and how important that relationship is to the stability of East and Southeast Asia. I know we have issues to resolve, but I believe we should step forward and resolve them in a way that enables us to understand the importance of what we are doing.

Senator Webb Q & A

Q. (Dr. O’Hanlon) I was wondering how the Guam relocation plan would be affected by budget pressure. Do you believe that, if the defense budget goes down as now scheduled, there will be pressure on the American side to rethink the current plan for budgetary reasons?

A. (Sen. Webb) There was a lot of pressure in the last budget cycle to hold off on expenditures because of the lack of clarity. I think it would be a huge mistake to bypass what we can bring to Guam from Okinawa in terms of the strategic relevance in the region. Guam is a major player. One third of the island is devoted to military use, but it is underutilized right now. Anderson Air Force Base, which was
operating at full capacity during the Vietnam War, is not even operating at 25 percent capacity. I think a lot of the cost elements are overstated. We should also remember that the Japanese government has offered to pay part of the relocation costs. There are people who are looking for places to cut the budget, but the fact that this issue has dragged out for so long is probably the reason they have held back.

Q. (Peter Ennis, Dispatch Japan) Now that the Ospreys have been deployed to Futenma, where do you think the impetus might come from to break the bureaucratic impasse that’s resulted in Futenma staying open for this long?

A. (Sen. Webb) I’ve read about the concerns that people on Okinawa have about the Osprey, but I believe it’s safe, and it is a quiet aircraft when you compare it to the (CH-46) helicopters it is replacing. My personal recommendation with respect to Kadena was to strip down a lot of the Air Force operations to other bases in Japan, move some to Anderson Air Force Base, and take the Futenma operations and put them in Kadena. So, with regard to the Osprey, I think people will and should become more relaxed. With regard to how long Futenma should continue, I’m a little concerned. I’ve seen budget requests that will extend the structures on Futenma for another ten years, and I’m concerned if we do that we might end up sliding into a semi-permanent situation on Futenma, when we need to shut it down and do something else.

Q. (Shaun Tandon, AFP News Agency) Getting back to the sexual assault case, what do you think the U.S. military can do to prevent such incidents from happening?

A. (Sen. Webb) No system is completely fail-safe. I believe that the number of incidents has been greatly reduced from earlier periods. But when these incidents happen, there’s just no excuse for them. The
military has done a lot. I shouldn’t in any way speculate as to what happened. All we’re saying is we regret it and we don’t want to see these things happen.

Q. (Victor Okim, U.S.-Japan Research) I’m curious about your idea about people-to-people programs in Okinawa. What would you recommend?

A. (Sen. Webb) Military-to-military interaction, interaction through commercial activities and trade, and educational and cultural exchanges—all these would be healthy. Compared to when I was in Okinawa before, a lot of our military has become more removed from basic everyday interaction with Okinawans. There should be more. I think it’s healthy for all of the elements to understand each other face to face.

Q. (TV Tokyo Correspondent) What about a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement?

A. (Sen. Webb) With respect to Status of Forces Agreements, they are shaped country by country. The criminal justice system of Japan is much fairer than that of, for example, Iraq. I don’t think it would be proper for me to speculate as to what the current situation is between the Department of Defense and the Japanese government over renegotiating a SOFA. But I do know that there is no hesitation from the American government in turning over American military people to the Japanese criminal justice system when they are accused of having committed a crime outside of American bases. There’s total respect for the Japanese criminal justice system in that regard.

Q. (Maeshiro Mieko, Okinawa Kai of Washington D.C.) I’ve been told there have been more rape incidents in Okinawa, that these incidents are underreported. I don’t know how true it is. Another question is, did the
Guam location not materialize because people in Guam did not want an expanded base?

A. (Sen. Webb) With respect to your question about sexual assaults, I really don’t have an answer. We can certainly ask the American military for an answer. With respect to Guam, my view is that the people of Guam want the military bases. We’ve had discussions with people worried about historical areas. There is always a trade-off, but Guam is an American territory and people from Guam serve proudly in the military. We’ve had many discussions about their concerns, but my view is that the people of Guam are wondering why it’s taking so long. And a lot of people in Okinawa are wondering why it’s taking so long.
IV.

Report on Research Activity

The Regional Security Policy Division examines researches and analyses security challenges and international affairs related to Okinawa, and further explores comprehensive security involving around the region of Okinawa from diverse viewpoints including such as risk management.

Opinions expressed or implied in the following article are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Okinawa Prefectural Government.
Regional Security: Perspective from Okinawa Prefecture
Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Regional Security Policy Division,
Executive Office of the Governor Okinawa Prefecture

1. Introduction

In the past, security policies have been considered as policies that should be promoted under the initiative of the nation as a whole. Municipalities, society and individuals have been incorporated into policies developed by the nation, and have been requested to cooperate with them, but were never expected to acquire or expand on an individual outlook on security policy.

However, since the 1980s, as diversification of the concept of security has progressed, there is more room for groups of municipalities and individuals - who were never considered to be the main actors regarding security policies in the past - to actively get involved in security or specific crisis management.

Within the geographic and social environment of Okinawa, local stakeholders should establish and develop their own approaches to security and crisis management for several reasons.

First, as an island prefecture that is not connected to other prefectures by land and therefore cannot expect prompt support from other prefectures, Okinawa is highly vulnerable to contingencies such as disasters and large-scale accidents.

Furthermore, considering the internal situation of Okinawa, 74% of all the U.S. military bases that are located in Japan are concentrated in the prefecture. Although it has an important role within the U.S.-Japan alliance, this concentration has become a basic cause of various questions about safety and order for the citizens of Okinawa.

Additionally, in recent years, Okinawa has become a municipality that represents one of the focal points of international relations in Asia, as the
“front line” of a strained relationship between Japan, China and Taiwan concerning the Senkaku Islands and its marine areas.

The vulnerability of Okinawa as an island prefecture, as well as the conflict between national security and the safety of citizens centered around U.S. military bases, and the tense international environment requires these matters to be immediately resolved in order for Okinawa to contribute to the continuance and prosperity of Japan, and also to ensure the security and safety of the residents of the prefecture and its visitors. Under such circumstances, it is important to establish well-defined guidelines that underlie necessary policies.

In regards to this point, the Okinawa Prefectural Government realizes the importance of creating a security environment centered on the multilateral cooperation of Asia in the future, while supporting its role under the U.S.-Japan alliance in ensuring the stability of East Asia.\(^{61}\)

Furthermore, the Okinawa Prefectural Government believes that there is a need for to improve the survey and research environment for security and risk management issues, which inform the security environment surrounding Okinawa and various crises such as natural disasters.\(^{62}\)

With such approaches by the Okinawa Prefectural Government taken into account, I would like to assess the possibilities of the positions which Okinawa should occupy in regard to regional security within the present security environment.

\(^{61}\) An example of the prefecture’s approach is provided in the following Governor’s statement at the 2nd Okinawa Prefecture Assembly in 2008 (regular meeting):

“As for the Prefecture, we understand that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements have been contributing to the maintenance of international peace and stability for Japan and East Asia and that the US military bases located in Japan have been fulfilling an important role, but we believe the creation of a multilateral and peaceful relationship that is extended over China and the Korean Peninsula including the Japan-U.S. relationship, and forming of a new international order in the future would be ideal.”

\(^{62}\) For example, the importance of security and crisis management for the prefectural government, and the survey and research related to the U.S. Military issues were pointed out in the Governor’s statement at the 5th Okinawa Prefecture Assembly in 2011 (regular meeting) and the 1st Okinawa Prefecture Assembly in 2012 (regular meeting).
The term “regional security” is often used to indicate the position of a country as an extension of national security, or the international security of a deeply inter-related region.\textsuperscript{63}

In contrast, in this paper, regional security pertains to all of the efforts of a municipality under the national government contributing to the security of the nation, and guaranteeing the security and safety of the people living there while making full use of its regional advantage.

By the way, the words “region” and “security,” which are respectively ambiguous, are included in the term “regional security.”

In this paper, the concepts of what “region” and ”security” separately stand for will be considered, and, after taking such considerations into account, thought will be given to the “Regional Security of Okinawa Prefecture” that should be part of the foundation of Okinawa Prefecture’s decision-making process.

2. Region

2-1 “Region” as a Concept

Hisashi Watanabe defined a region as “a general historic space that possesses individuality,” and indicated the following 4 points as attributes of the concept of a region; (1) multi-layer, (2) regionality, (3) three-faceted, and (4) historicity.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, a region exists as spatially overlapped with its neighboring regions, while subsuming smaller regions within it, or conversely being subsumed by a larger region (multi-layer). A region may be recognized as a ”region” through the aspect of a natural space that is

\textsuperscript{63} Some of the most advanced research that discusses regional security from the viewpoint of national security is by Ken, Jimbo(ed.), \textit{Asia Taiheiyou no Anzen hosyō Architecture –Chiiki Anzen hosyō no San Sou Kōzō} (Asia-Pacific Security Architecture: Tiered Structure of Regional Security), Nippon Hyoron Sha Co., December “012. Ltd., December 2011.

\textsuperscript{64} Hisashi Watanabe “Chiiki to wa Nani ka (What is a Region)”, Hisashi Watanabe (ed.), \textit{Yōroppa no Hakken (Discovery of Europe)}, Yuhikaku Publishing Co., Ltd., November 2000, p. 342, pp. 347-349.
prescribed by geography and climate and the aspect of a social space prescribed by the activities of people living there (regionality). Region as a social space possesses the three properties of political space, economic space and living space (three-faceted). But each of the regions that are prescribed in such a way, are not universal and will be developed and transformed through historical changes (historicity).

These concepts of a region which Watanabe argued have been considered for Europe, but these four attributes that are presented here can be applied to East Asia, including Okinawa, and these concepts of a region are appropriate as a foundation for this paper’s deliberations on regional security.

2-2 Okinawa as a “Region”

What kind of a region should Okinawa be understood as?

In the following, this paper analyzes Okinawa’s regional features with particular focus on the multi-layer and regionality attributes among Watanabe’s four attributes of a region (i.e. multi-layer, regionality, three-faceted and historicity). In the discussion on its regionality attribute, this paper examines Okinawa as a political space and an economic space.

As a geographical space, Okinawa Prefecture constitutes the section of the southwest islands located in the southwest of Japan, and is an island prefecture that consists of over 160 islands floating on a vast marine area that stretches 1,000km east to west, and 400km north to south.\(^6\)

As a political space, Okinawa Prefecture is primarily significant as a municipality that constitutes a part of Japan. At the same time, it possesses the property of inevitably interchanging with the outside Asian countries beyond its boundaries, as the municipality that is located on the westernmost tip of Japan. Additionally, as 74% of the U.S. Military bases existing in Japan are located in Okinawa, it can also be considered as a space that supports a significant portion of Japan’s diplomacy and security.

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The property of Okinawa Prefecture as such a political space is also connected to the economic space.

For example, as shown on Figure 1, the ratio of Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan and other ASEAN countries) accounting for the volume of export in fiscal year 2011 under the Okinawa Regional Customs is 76%, which shows the highest ratio among the customs of each region in Japan. This ratio results from many exports being exported from Japan to the Asian region through Okinawa, and so, the ratios accounting for the actual total amount of trade and amount of imports are roughly average. However, the results show Okinawa Prefecture’s position as a bridge between Japan and other Asian countries.  

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66 Among the amount of export of 82,118,538,000 yen of the Okinawa Regional Customs for fiscal 2010, exports to Asia totaled to 73,541,860,000 yen, which accounts for approximately 89.5% of the total.
## Figure 1. Ratio of Trade with Asia with each Regional Customs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Amount of Export (million yen)</th>
<th>Amount of Imports (million yen)</th>
<th>Amount of Trade (million yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakodate</td>
<td>540,713</td>
<td>303,501</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>14,263,482</td>
<td>8,144,539</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>10,732,054</td>
<td>6,158,156</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>14,002,094</td>
<td>5,805,748</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>8,879,298</td>
<td>6,295,086</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobe</td>
<td>10,209,023</td>
<td>5,951,475</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moji</td>
<td>6,317,987</td>
<td>3,790,051</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>544,285</td>
<td>193,816</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>57,538</td>
<td>43,502</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Okinawa Prefecture’s current position is the natural result of historical continuity. In the times of its existence as the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, Okinawa enjoyed prosperity as a transit point for trade and exchange between Japan and continental Asia, or Japan and Southeast Asia, and continued to connect Honshu (the central island of Japan) and the regions of Asia even after becoming part of Japan in the modern era.

Essentially, Okinawa is a bridge for Japan with East Asia and Southeast Asia, and is considered to constitute the center of the East China Sea region as a sub-region that connects both regions.\(^{67}\)

In summary, Okinawa forms a multi-layered region that simultaneously possesses a regional character as one of Japan’s administrative wards, “Okinawa as Japan” (Okinawa as a locality), and an aspect of “Okinawa as Asia” (Okinawa as a region) that has been historically developed.

This multi-layered nature that Okinawa possesses is in itself an important asset to the prefecture, and is an important consideration for Okinawa Prefecture to make when deliberating on regional security. This point will be revisited later in this paper.

3. Security

3-1 Changes in the Concept of Security

According to Hiroshi Nakanishi, individuals and the nation are inseparably tied together under the modern concept of security. Nakanishi pointed out that, whether it be the realism of Hobbes or the liberalism of Rousseau, this “agrees to see the enhancement of the safety of individuals

\(^{67}\) The following literature is detailed in regards to sub-regions that pertain to the smaller regions that exist extending over several nations, which are contained in the general regions of Europe and East Asia. Hiroshi Momose, *Kai chiiki kyoryoku to Tenkanki Kokusai kankei* (Sub-regional Cooperation and the Transitioning International Relations), Yushindo Kobunsha Co., Ltd., February 1996.
as a virtue, and the existence of a nation as a means for accomplishing it.”

Such a relationship between individuals and nations concerning security constituted a foundation for the concept of security from the start of modern times and beyond. The continuance of a nation was agreed upon even at times when it was accompanied by restrictions on freedom due to this relationship. Also, war between nations being deemed as the most important issue over many years was due to no reason other than war itself being seen as the largest threat against the stability and continuance of a nation.

However, since the 1980s onwards, issues and actions that should be handled under the auspices of security research have been greatly expanding. According to Barry Buzan, there have been two criticisms in the background of the diversification of the concept of security in recent years. They are, firstly, the criticism of considering the concept of “security” that differs between regions to be possible from post-colonialism, and, secondly, the indication from Critical Security Studies, which argues that the security of everyday life such as the environment and food is an issue that is more serious for the average individual than war between nations. Critical Security Studies also point out that a nation is not always a reliable provider of security to improve such issues.

Within contemporary security studies, issues such as terrorism, crime, and environmental issues are conceptualized as “non-traditional security”, and are recognized as issues of security. At the same time, types of security for the existences that are generally positioned at the sub-national

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70 In reality, the term, MOOTW (Military Operation Other Than War), has been adopted in doctrines of the U.S. and NATO from the 1990s and on, and the commitment of military power to the eradication of terrorism and organized crime, maintenance of peace, disaster relief, etc. has been conceptualized.
level, such as society and individuals, are being studied along with national security.

There are two viewpoints for the diversification of such concepts of security. The first viewpoint is the idea that the issues that threaten national stability and threats are becoming diversified, accompanying the growth of economic interdependence and intensification of trans-boundary issues, including global environment issues, with the concept of security that placed the nation in its center as a prerequisite.

The second viewpoint shares the point of indicating the diversification of threats with the first viewpoint, but seeks grounds for recognizing such threats by shifting the center of the concept of security from the nation to society and individuals. This reconsiders the relationship that has been agreed upon with the nation and individuals, and attempts to address the concept of security from a more basic angle. In such a situation, the relationship between a nation and individuals concerning security is not always self-evident and affirmative, and a nation does not fully satisfy the role of increasing the safety for individuals, but possible obstructive factors to the relationship are considered according to the circumstances. Therefore, the creation of new concepts of security differing from traditional national security will be pursued, and the diversification of subjects of security and threats will also be emphasized as a process or result of such pursuit from such situations. The “Human Security” study can be referred to as a representative study of the new security studies that are based on such situations.

Contemporary security concepts are presented in Figure 2, based on the argument mentioned above. From this, the problem area that is included in the concept of security can be seen to expand from the “traditional security,” which represents conflicts between nations, on the top left towards the bottom right in a radial manner.
**Figure 2. Today’s Concepts of Security and Examples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Things that Take Threats</th>
<th>Things that Impose Threats (Subject of Threats)</th>
<th>Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-National Acting Bodies</td>
<td>Traditional Security Energy, Revolts, Civil Wars</td>
<td>Threats, Environmental Destruction, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Racial Oppression, Civil Wars, Communal Conflict</td>
<td>Social Security (security for citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Oppression, Crime, Assassination Abduction</td>
<td>Diseases, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Terrorism, Domestic Security, International Issues</td>
<td>Environmental Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by the author based on Yoshinobu Yamamoto (ed.), Asia Taiheiyo no Anzen hosyō to America (Asia Pacific Security and USA), Sairyusya, April 2005, p.25.

### 3-2 National Security and “Human Security”

Contemporary security studies embrace various viewpoints and approaches as above. Based on these matters, I would like to set “Human Security” as the starting point in this paper for considering the regional security of Okinawa Prefecture.

This is because the diversity of today’s concept of security is largely due to the appearance of the non-traditional security studies that have generally sought for something “other than nations” (society and individuals) as subjects and objects of security, and such diversity has been determined by the appearance of “Human Security” studies and its expansion.

Including the Comprehensive Security presented by the Japanese Government in the 1970s, the idea of capturing various phenomena other than war and conflicts also existed in the past, but as Akiko Fukushima has pointed out, “Human Security” did “not replace the concepts of security of the past, but was brought forth from the gaps of the past concepts of
security.” As for its grounds, Fukushima raised the point of “Human” being set as the object, and international organizations and NGOs also being subjects of security in addition to nations.

The concept of “Human Security” was generalized by the Human Development Report “Human Security” of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that was published in 1994.

The report firstly points out that the concept of security during the period of the Cold War was a security concept for nations centered on the preservation of territorial integrity. Then, it emphasizes the need for “Human Security” that directly protects individuals from threats such as diseases, famine, unemployment, crime, social friction, political oppression, environmental disasters, etc., in order to deal with the various crises after the end of the Cold War.

In this report, “Human Security” consisted of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from insufficiency”, and was envisioned as a comprehensive concept of security that emphasizes the independence of individuals, and aims for the peace of the regional society, nation and the world, by promoting the development of potential abilities of the people.

This “Human Security” is characterized by the 4 characteristics of, (1) being a universal issue applicable to both rich and poor countries, (2) its constituents relate interdependently, as can be observed with the indications on the factor of poverty in bringing about terrorism, (3) targeting issues with which early prevention is effective, and (4) being a people-centered concept.

Subsequently, “Human Security” has been adopted in documents by the United Nations a number of times, and efforts have been made to make the

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72 However, the idea of considering security by people as a unit has been present from the 18th century. Akiko Fukushima, ibid., pp.8-9.
74 UNDP, ibid., pp.24-25.
75 UNDP, ibid., pp.22-23.
concept more detailed. Japan also presented “Human Security” at an early stage, and contributed to its expansion.

At present, the Japanese government considers “Human Security” as an approach to “protect peoples from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity, and to enhance human fulfillment. For these objectives, human security tries to integrate and strengthen initiatives that emphasize human-centered perspectives.”

Ever since “Human Security” first made its appearance, various discussions have been held on how this concept is related to national security: the central concept of traditional security. Some issues, such as the increase in terrorist activities (e.g. the September 11 attacks) and the spread of infectious diseases, threaten the stability of nations and societies, and require global cooperation to solve. In this situation, national security and “Human Security” are considered to exist in a mutually complementary manner instead of being an exclusive relationship in which one side will deny the other.

3-3 Issues with “Human Security”

Mary Kaldor has pointed out that “Human Security” is “conceptualized as a matter that incorporates the core elements of human development and human rights.” The recognition of the concept of “Human Security” that noticeably includes elements of human development has been further clarified by Amartya Sen, and by Sadako Ogata, two prominent scholars on “Human Security.”

As a result, arguments concerning “Human Security” have become centered on topics regarding the circumstances of developing countries.

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77 For example, Amartya Sen, Hinkon no Kokuhuku (Mastering of Poverty), Shueisya Inc., January 2002 and Sadako Ogata, Kokka no Anzen hosyō kara Ningen no Anzen hosyō e (From National security to Human security), Speech manuscript covered in Ogata’s memoir Watashi no Shigoto (My challenge), Soshisya Publishing Co.Ltd., November 2002.
The recognition that considering “Human Security” as a worldwide issue that doesn’t make any distinction between developed or developing countries, which was pointed out by the UNDP, seemed to have receded.

The Japanese government also considers “Human Security” as a part of the diplomatic policies led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and “Human Security” has almost never been studied as a domestic policy.

Today, however, the need to substantiate the domestic “Human Security” of developed countries has occasionally been brought up. 78

Although immigration problems are often taken up as a domestic “Human Security” issue of developed countries, Okinawa Prefecture also has a particular issue concerning “Human Security.” Namely, the dilemma between national security and “Human Security.” 79

This dilemma has developed out of the fact that although the U.S. military in Okinawa contributes to Japan’s national security, it endangers the safety of citizens of the region, or say “the Human Security,” through some of its military activities, and crimes or problematic behavior by military personnel. The “conflict between national security and the safety of citizens centered around U.S. military bases” that I referred to in this paper’s introduction is part of this dilemma.

The assistance and cooperation of municipalities, the private sector, research institutes (including universities), and various other organizations are essential for solving these issues of “Human Security” as a domestic problem.

Given the above, Okinawa Prefecture also needs to work to solve the dilemma between national security and “Human Security.”

The “regional security of Okinawa Prefecture” is something that should become the guideline for such efforts. In the next chapter, I would like to explain the details of this “regional security of Okinawa Prefecture.”

4. The Regional Security of Okinawa Prefecture

4-1. Dilemma concerning “Human Security” and Okinawa Prefecture

As stated above, there is a dilemma between national security and “Human Security.” The military base issues in Okinawa Prefecture is a perfect example of such a dilemma.

However, national security and “Human Security” are primarily supposed to exist in a mutually complementary manner, and resolving the dilemma between the two should be an important concern for Okinawa Prefecture and for all of Japan.

This is because removing potential risks, which are associated with U.S. military bases, to the “Human Security” of the citizens of the region increases the validity of Japan’s national security in the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Also, such an improvement in national security, with the guarantee of “Human Security” as a prerequisite, contributes to the enhancement of “Human Security” through the resulting stability of the international environment surrounding Okinawa.

This is not a position that simply advocates the principles of “Human Security.” It is also not a position that excludes the viewpoint of national security.

Eventually, the efforts of Okinawa Prefecture to resolve the dilemma between national security and “Human Security” will improve current domestic “Human Security” and help the prefecture to develop guidelines to seek to simultaneously guarantee national security and “Human Security.”
4-2 The Regional Security of Okinawa Prefecture

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the viewpoint of the regional security of Okinawa Prefecture considered alongside national security and “Human Security.” As the figure shows, the matter of regional security coexisting with national security and “Human Security” is a given condition. Regional security is a concept that is mutually compatible with national security and “Human Security,” being placed in a multi-tiered manner between these two concepts.

Figure 3. Regional Security of Okinawa Prefecture, National Security and “Human Security”

A: Practical use of regional features (such as regional talks)
B: Enhancement of crisis management abilities
C: Securing accessibility/empowerment

Prepared by the author

When regional security is placed in the center and considering relations between the three concepts of security, three areas can be considered.

In other words, there is the “A” area at which national security and regional security overlaps, the “B” area, which is particular to regional security, and the “C” area, at which regional security and “Human Security” overlap.

Okinawa Prefecture’s main task in Area A is the stabilization of an international environment that will positively affect the prefectural area.
The strained relationship between Japan, China and Taiwan concerning the Senkaku Islands and their marine areas is a specific example of an issue in this area.

Ever since the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese Government was declared, relations between Japan, China and Taiwan have deteriorated, and the deterioration of the relationship between Japan and China in particular has had an impact on the economic relationship that had been favorable until then.

Okinawa Prefecture was also impacted. The number of foreign visitors was 14,300 visitors (+2.9%) in November 2012, a result of a dramatic decrease in visitors from China and from Hong Kong. The number of visitors from China was 700 (-75.9%), and 2,000 visitors (-44.4%) were from Hong Kong. Additionally, a wide range of other economic impacts occurred, including Chinese-related airlines suspending operations and postponing arrivals, and the cancellation of all sorts of exchange programs.

The continuation of such circumstances over a long period will prolong the estranged relations between both countries, and will make the peaceful resolution of the issue more difficult. Furthermore, this matter has indeed become a “Human Security” concern as a matter of vital importance for the continuation of business for small-scale enterprises.

The realization of regional security in Area A pertains to the resolution of such circumstances, and the regional aspect of Okinawa Prefecture and its history of representing the center of regional exchange as a bridge with East Asia and Southeast Asia, which was mentioned under “Chapter 2. Region” in this paper, should inform this area.

Specifically, the realization of regional security, through the maximum usage of these Okinawa’s geographical characteristics, would be able to alleviate the strained relationships in the region and would enhance possibilities for mutual.

As a side note, the forecast on areas that will be flooded by tsunamis if a giant earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 - which is about the same degree as that of the Great East Japan Earthquake - were to occur in the adjacent
seas of Okinawa was conducted by the Okinawa Prefecture Tsunami Damage Estimation and Research Committee and published at the end of January 2013. According to the forecast, the maximum height of a tsunami may exceed 20m at 32 locations, including some entire islands that will be completely submerged under water.\textsuperscript{80}

Being confronted with the possible occurrence of unprecedented disasters today, the enhancement of Okinawa Prefecture’s crisis management capabilities is a central issue for Area B.

Whether a phenomenon can be called a crisis or not depends upon the relationship between that phenomenon and society, and it largely depends on the recognition of the people concerned. From such matters, it is considered that there are several elements included in a crisis that make people recognize it as a crisis. Generally, the three elements of threat recognition, urgency, and uncertainty are considered. For example, Sara Larsson’s group from the research and educational center on crisis management of the Swedish National Defense College define a crisis as: “A situation is a crisis when it is perceived by central decision makers that basic values are threatened, there is limited time available and there is a considerable degree of uncertainty.”\textsuperscript{81}

If this definition is taken into account, crisis management can be considered as the responses to crisis including those that are executed beforehand and afterwards, that are executed for reducing the uncertainty and limited time related to crises, together with minimizing damages and impacts of crises.

Based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law and Civil Protection Act, Okinawa Prefecture is responsible for responding to various crises that occur in the prefectural area, and securing the safety of its citizens and visitors.

\textsuperscript{80} Okinawa Times, February 3, 2013, special article on 6\textsuperscript{th} page, “Maximum Inflow Height exceeding 20 meters at 32 locations.”

Securing an autonomous crisis management capability is vital to Okinawa Prefecture, for it is an island prefecture that does not have a land connection to any other prefectures.

On the other hand, the main challenge in Area C is, as has been already pointed out, to resolve various issues concerning the U.S. military in Okinawa.

Especially, relief for victims of accidents and crimes related to U.S. military is an important matter from the viewpoint of “Human Security.”

Although the number of incidents and accidents due to the U.S. military in Okinawa in recent years has been on a downward trend, the number of incidents off-base is on an upward trend, and evidence in recent years shows that the number of incidents off-base is exceeding the number of incidents on-base in some areas (refer to Figure 4).

In addition, despite the fact that the number of criminal arrests of U.S. military-related personnel sharply dropped immediately after the 1995 schoolgirl rape incident, it rose to 112 cases in 2003, and has risen and fallen over time ever since (refer to Figure 5).

Under the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), jurisdiction for many of the crimes committed by U.S. Military members is left to the discretion of the U.S., and crimes tend to easily become special circumstances.

In regards to this point, the Japanese government has been taking the position of exerting efforts to correct problems through improving the implementation of the SOFA. One of the accomplishments, for example, is that Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement not to exclude any crimes committed by U.S. service members, including rape and murder, from consideration by the U.S. to hand over suspects before they have been charged. However, crimes that have been subject to such flexible

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management were formerly limited to those that the Japanese Government was seriously concerned about, and the response from the U.S. has only been made in accordance with its own considerations. This reality lets the suspect enjoy more advantages than usual criminals, and so the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture constantly experience great anxiety for their safety.

**Figure 4. Timeline of the Number of Accidents Due to the U.S. Military in Okinawa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>On Bases</th>
<th>Off Bases</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by the author based on p.104 of “The U.S. Military and JSDF Bases in Okinawa (statistics)”

**Figure 5. Cases of Criminal Arrests of U.S. Military Members**

(Until December 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vicious Crime</th>
<th>Violent Crime</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Intellectual Crime</th>
<th>Morals Offense</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by the author based on p.108 of “The U.S. Military and JSDF Bases in Okinawa (statistics)”
Because the citizens of the region face special fears in Okinawa, there is a need to pay special attention to “freedom from fear”, which is an important component of “Human Security.”

Although there was not much room in this paper to review some aspects about the “Human Security” concept, this is because even for the people in the position of interpreting “Human Security” most precisely, the concern that has always been targeted was “freedom from fear.”

The main matter considered concerning “freedom from fear” is the threat against the body, soul and dignity, through criminal violence. When considering freedom from such crimes and violence in general, it is essential to establish a legal system and procedures, with the purposes of deterrence and victim relief.

In regards to this point, although improvements in the implementation of the present SOFA have been made, as previously mentioned, more efforts are required to improve victims’ access to relief and compensation.

As such, each of the A, B and C areas have important tasks, and there are measures that must be taken. Additionally, as a point that needs to be emphasized once again, these are only classifications for convenience, and are actually mutually linked.

For example, Kaldor points out that, “Human Security” is involved in crisis management. It includes the element of the private sector and the military element. It presents the course for action, and provides a series of principles for conducting crisis management.”

As long as regional security has a foothold within both ”Human Security” and national security, then the improvement of crisis management capability as Kaldor considers can be said to be the core for realizing regional security.

In fact, disasters and accidents are also considered as important issues under “Human Security,” and improving these capabilities for Okinawa.

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Prefecture will hold great significance for the realization of “Human Security” in the prefecture.

Similarly, with regards to promoting regional talks for alleviating heightened tensions concerning the Senkaku Islands, if the preparations for large-scale accidents, disasters, infectious disease outbreaks and other crisis can be shared at the regional level, then Okinawa Prefecture’s crisis management capability will improve remarkably.

The mutually complementary relationship between “Human Security” and national security has already been discussed in this paper, but, to mention once again, in conformity with the discussions until this point, actions by Japan and the U.S. to promise appropriate handling, indemnity and relief in regards to accidents and crimes due to U.S. military-related personnel will increase the validity of the U.S.-Japan alliance, maintain the alliance, and will reduce various costs related to its implementation. In addition, this will improve Okinawa Prefecture’s social stability, together with the reduction of the significant burden on Okinawa Prefecture from hosting the majority of U.S. military bases in Japan. The stable U.S.-Japan alliance that will be realized through such actions will help stabilize the international environment surrounding Okinawa Prefecture and can be expected to further improve “Human Security.”

5. Conclusion

In this paper, the regional security of Okinawa Prefecture as a guideline for specific policies has been considered based on the examination of the concept of a “region” and changes in the recent security theory.

The regional security of Okinawa Prefecture can be summarized as follows:

1) Set the coexistence of national security and “Human Security” as its norm,
2) Make full use of Okinawa Prefecture’s regional features and its own capabilities,
3) Protect the lives, properties and dignity of citizens of the prefecture and its visitors from any threats that can be anticipated by national security and “Human Security.”

There are a wide range of modern security threats, and the approach for each type of threat may seem to be mutually un-related at a glance. However, regional exchanges and responses to issues concerning the U.S. military in Okinawa, and various approaches for the development of Okinawa’s crisis management capability, can be generally considered as approaches that contribute to improving regional security.

However, discussions to organize approaches to these issues are not conducted frequently enough.

The regional security of Okinawa Prefecture in this paper is a concept for connecting individual policies to seek larger outcomes and goals for the safety of the region.

Simultaneously, the idea of regional security itself is also expected to become more sophisticated through the qualitative and quantitative fulfillment of policies.

In order to maximize synergy between policies and ideas, it is important to fulfill various policies that will contribute to the realization of regional security, and to refine concepts based on that.
This study presents the findings of a first-time survey conducted by the Okinawa Prefectural Government in Okinawa Prefecture from November 21 to December 12, 2012.

The timing of the survey coincided with the deterioration of relations between Japan and China with regard to the Senkaku Islands, and this inevitably influenced Okinawan citizens’ views of China.

The Okinawa Prefectural Government will conduct further opinion surveys among Okinawa citizens next year and thereafter.
Public Opinion Survey: Okinawa and Challenges for Japan-China Relations
Okinawa Prefectural Government

(Implementation and Objectives)

The Okinawa Prefectural Government conducted a “Survey on Okinawans’ Impressions of China” in Okinawa from November 21 to December 12, 2012.

The survey was intended as a means of helping to ascertain Okinawan attitudes toward China and Taiwan, and to provide a basic resource for future measures.

(Survey Findings and the Need for Further Research)

As this survey consisted primarily of questions eliciting the respondent’s impressions of China, a series of events related to the Senkaku Islands occurring around the time that the survey was conducted is assumed to have influenced the results. In any comparison between attitudes in Okinawa and in Japan as a whole, attention must be paid to differences in the timing of the surveys involved.

To enable the formulation of new policy measures informed by objective polling, analysis, and research on relations with China, which is one of the most important nations to Okinawa, it will be necessary to continue to do multifaceted research, including follow-up surveys.

(Analysis of Survey Findings)

Professor Akio Takahara of the University of Tokyo provides a precise analysis of the survey findings, supplemented by commentary. Also, Professor Kurayoshi Takara of the University of the Ryukyus contributed comments on Okinawan perspectives on Japan-China relations, which forms the basis for interpretation of the survey findings.

Readers will find that these commentaries together shed light on perceptions of China and Taiwan held by people in Okinawa.
(Relationship between Okinawa and China in the Past)

From the time when the Ryukyu Kingdom, a maritime nation-state, was a Chinese tributary, through the Meiji Restoration in the modern era, and also since Okinawa became a prefecture within the nation of Japan, Okinawa and China have maintained a relationship arising from their geographical proximity.

Even amid the turbulent international relations of the postwar era, the people of Okinawa have remained keenly interested in the continent facing them across the East China Sea, and in Taiwan. It’s generally understood that Okinawa is the region of Japan most affected by the situation in China and by China’s actions.

(Efforts by Okinawa)

Okinawa Prefecture has interacted with China on a cultural level in the past, for example, by establishing a sister-state relationship with the Chinese province of Fujian; exchanging high school students; and receiving official compilations of historical diplomatic documents (Rekidai Hōan) from China. Additionally, the Okinawa Prefectural Government takes pride in having boosted economic and tourism-related interactions with China by establishing offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taipei. Okinawa has drawn increasing numbers of Chinese tourists, has developed more channels for sales of its local goods, and air routes between Okinawa and China have expanded.

In an opinion survey conducted among people attending a cultural event in February 2013, around 90 percent of the respondents indicated that it’s necessary to have friendly relations between Okinawa and China, and more than 80 percent of them expressed a desire for Okinawa to play the role of facilitator in such a relationship. This reconfirmed the importance of and desire for efforts by Okinawa to interact with China.

85 A friendship festival, called “Akemodoro,” celebrating Chinese, Japanese, Amami, and Okinawan culture. See next page for details.
(Okinawa’s Future Roles)

In a March 2010 plan entitled the “Okinawa 21st Century Vision,” Okinawa Prefectural Government expressed the decision that Okinawa will make effective use of its regional characteristics to foster trust-based relationships with Asia-Pacific nations and achieve various forms of security, including cultural and environmental measures, in order to contribute to creating peace for Japan.

Peace and stability in East Asia are essential for the realization of this vision. We hope that, with the publication of this survey and the accompanying report, Okinawa Prefecture will begin to consider the role it should play in the future promoting dialogue and mutual understanding in this region.

Okinawa Prefectural Government
March 2013
“Akemodoro”: Chinese, Japanese, Amami, and Okinawan Culture and Friendship Festival - Performance with Dynamic Asia Symphony -

Date: Sunday, February 17, 2013, 2:00 p.m.
Location: Okinawa Convention Center
Overview: “Akemodoro” is a culture and friendship festival featuring artists from China, Japan, the Amami Islands, and Okinawa. The festival commemorates the 40th anniversary of Okinawa’s return to Japan, the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the 15th anniversary of the establishment of a friendship between Okinawa Prefecture and the Chinese province of Fujian. The festival also sought to improve relations between Japan and China.

To utilize its characteristics for peaceful coexistence and openness in the world, Okinawa and the Amami Islands, which shares similar culture with Okinawa, held the event as a launching point (Akemodoro) for forging ties with China and the rest of Asia based on four key concepts: interaction, coexistence, peace, and culture. The event was also intended to advance the hope that a self-sustaining Okinawa can serve as the soul and the conscience (Chimugukuru) of Asia.

<Survey>
A ten-question survey was conducted among the people in attendance; 1,479 responses were received. The following is a partial account of the findings.

Question: Do you think Japan and Okinawa need to have friendly relations with China?

![Pie chart showing the responses to the question about the need for friendly relations between Japan and Okinawa.]

- Highly Necessary, 48.7%
- Necessary, 40.6%
- Not Necessary, 1.6%
- Don’t Know, 5.6%
- No Response, 2.6%

Question: What should Okinawa’s role be in relation to friendly relations between Japan and China?

![Pie chart showing the responses to the question about Okinawa’s role in friendly relations between Japan and China.]

- Should Promote Positive Relations Very Actively, 58.5%
- Should Promote Positive Relations, 25.4%
- No Role Whatsoever, 6.7%
- No Special Role, 1.0%
- Don’t Know, 3.2%
- No Response, 11.2%
Results of a Survey on Okinawans’ Impressions of China
Survey conducted by Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government

1. Overview of Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Survey title</th>
<th>“Survey on Okinawans’ Impressions of China”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) Purpose of the survey</td>
<td>To understand Okinawans’ impressions of China (Taiwan) and use this as basic information for policy-making.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (3) Survey subjects | ① Population: Male/female residents of Okinawa Prefecture between the ages of 15 and 75  
② Sample size: 3,000 people  
③ Sampling method: Stratified two-stage random sampling |
| (4) Survey method | By postal mail (a thank-you/reminder note in postcard format was sent once to all survey subjects) |
| (5) Survey period | November 21 through December 12, 2012 |
| (6) Collection results | Number of effective responses (percent) = 1,187 persons (39.6%) |
| (7) Other | The prefecture was divided into six regions: 1) North, 2) Central, 3) Naha City, 4) South, 5) Miyako, and 6) Yaeyama. The samples were weighted such that samples from the Miyako and Yaeyama regions were multiplied by four and samples from the North region were multiplied by two because of their smaller populations compared with those of the Central, Naha City, and South regions. |

 Nationwide Survey to be used for Comparison
In the figures and tables of survey results, the following nationwide survey results are shown as a reference for comparison in order to acquire a relative understanding of Okinawans’ impressions.
“The 8th Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey” by The Genron NPO (authorized NPO)

Survey subjects: Males/females age 18 or over throughout Japan (excluding high school students)

Survey method: door-to-door home visits

Survey period: April 26 through May 14, 2012

Number of effective responses: 1,000

Note: During the time between the nationwide survey and this survey, large-scale anti-Japanese protests and such have occurred in China; therefore, caution is necessary in making comparisons of survey results.
2. Tally Sheets

1) Impression of China

Q1. What kind of impression do you have of China? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable impression</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favorable impression</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable impression</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable impression</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To those who answered in Q1 that they have a favorable impression or somewhat favorable impression.

Q1 SQ1. Why do you have a favorable impression? (Select as many as applicable.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because the development of the Chinese economy has become an integral part of the Japanese economy</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I can see progress in exchanges between private citizens, such as student exchanges</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because meetings between leaders occur frequently and government relations are stable</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the development of Chinese society looks promising in the future</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because China provided assistance after the Great East Japan Earthquake</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because fewer comments have been made about historical issues concerning China</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Chinese politics have changed to value Japan-China relations</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I am interested in Chinese cuisine, history, and culture</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Chinese people are honest, hard-working, and active</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because words and deeds by Chinese people remind of their grandeur</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Chinese products are inexpensive and appealing</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because China has begun to care about the rules of international politics</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To those who answered in Q1 that they have an unfavorable impression or somewhat unfavorable impression

Q1 SQ2. Why do you have an unfavorable impression? (Select as many as applicable.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because the political system is different</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of wars in the past</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because they criticize Japan about historical issues and so forth</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I cannot understand the patriotic behavior and thinking of Chinese people</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because they appear selfish in terms of securing resources and energy</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I am concerned about their military buildup and unpredictability</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I dislike China’s actions as a world power</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because China’s behavior appears domineering</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because conflict over the Senkaku Islands is continuing</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because their actions differ from international rules</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Impression of Taiwan

Q2. What kind of impression do you have of Taiwan? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impression</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable impression</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favorable impression</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable impression</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable impression</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To those who answered in Q2 that they have an unfavorable impression or somewhat unfavorable impression

Q2 SQ2. Why do you have an unfavorable impression? (Select as many as applicable.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural commonality</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ties</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long history of relations</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic proximity</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Taiwan provided assistance after the Great East Japan Earthquake</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I think Taiwanese people have a favorable impression of us</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To those who answered in Q2 that they have an unfavorable impression or somewhat unfavorable impression

Q2 SQ2. Why do you have an unfavorable impression? (Select as many as applicable.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because they sometimes criticize Japan about historical issues and so forth</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive relationship in terms of economics and technology</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural wariness</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the conflict over the Senkaku Islands is continuing</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I think Taiwanese have a negative impression of us</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3) **Obstacles to Japan-China relations**

Q3. What do you think are the main issues hindering the development of Japan-China relations? (Select up to three.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese and Chinese people do not trust each other</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes over marine resources and so forth</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial issues</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic friction</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern over Japan’s security policy</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s military build-up</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiment</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s problems with recognizing history</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s unresolved wartime issues</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s anti-Japanese education</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of the U.S.-Japan alliance</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Taiwan issue</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes by Chinese residents of Japan</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences between the Chinese and Japanese political systems</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights issues in China</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems concerning the safety of products made in China</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The textbook issue and right-wing propaganda activities</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) **Are Japan-China relations important today?**

Q4. Do you think Japan-China relations are important for Japan today? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither important or unimportant</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unimportant</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5) Do you feel closer to China or to the U.S.?
Q5. Do you feel closer to China or to the U.S.? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closer to China</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer to the U.S.</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally close to both</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to neither</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Do you feel closer to China or to Taiwan?
Q6. Do you feel closer to China or to Taiwan? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closer to China</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer to Taiwan</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally close to both</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to neither</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7) What historical issues should be resolved?
Q7. What historical issues between Japan and China do you think are important to resolve? (Select as many as applicable.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s recognition of wartime aggression</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s history textbooks</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s war reparations</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s understanding of the Nanking Massacre</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments about China by Japanese politicians</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasts about China by Japanese media</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of apology by Japanese about history</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Japanese education and content of textbooks in China</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments about Japan by Chinese politicians</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasts about Japan by Chinese media</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No more major problems to be resolved</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8) Will a military conflict arise in East Asian seas?

Q8. Do you think that a military conflict, for example between Japan and China, will arise in East Asian seas? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think it will arise within several years</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it will arise in the long-term future</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not think it will arise</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it will arise within several years</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it will arise in the future</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not think it will arise</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9) Do territorial issues exist?

Q9. Do you think that territorial issues exist between Japan and China? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues exist</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues do not exist</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t care</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To those who answered that territorial issues do exist in Q9

Q9 SQ. How do you think these issues should be resolved? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They should be resolved quickly through bilateral negotiations</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instead of hurrying to resolve the issues, they should be shelved for now to avoid escalation of conflict</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They should be shelved for the long term, and for now we should aim for joint development of resources</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They should be brought to the International Court of Justice</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10) **Have you ever been to China or Taiwan?**

Q10. Have you ever been to China (not including Taiwan)? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q11. Have you ever been to Taiwan? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11) **Do you have any Chinese or Taiwanese acquaintances?**

Q12. Do you have any Chinese (not including Taiwanese) acquaintances? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close acquaintances and/or friends</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintances and/or friends with whom I talk a little</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No acquaintances (now or in the past)</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q13. Do you have any Taiwanese acquaintances? (Select one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close acquaintances and/or friends</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintances and/or friends with whom I talk a little</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No acquaintances (now or in the past)</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>